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Abstract
E-voting has been introduced prematurely to national elections in many
countries worldwide. There are technical and organizational barriers which must
be resolved before the use of e-voting can be recommended in such a critical
context.
Two fundamental requirements for e-voting systems are in conflict: ballot-
secrecy and accuracy. We describe the nature and implications of this conflict,
and examine the two main categories of proposed solutions: cryptographic
voting schemes, and Voter Verified Audit Trails (VVATs). The conflict may
permanently rule out the use of remote e-voting for critical elections, especially
when one considers that there is no known way to reproduce the enforced privacy
of a voting booth outside the supervision of a polling station.
We then examine the difficulty faced by governments when they procure
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) systems in general, and
some mitigation strategies. We go on to describe some legal implications of the
introduction of e-voting, which could have serious consequences if not adequately
explored, and discuss the evaluation and maintenance of systems.
In the final chapters we explore two approaches to the development of
requirements for e-voting.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Elections are a critical component of any democracy, whether they are
considered ‘safety’ or ‘mission’ critical [1, 2, 3]. Elections decide the fate of
countries and their citizens, so while the introduction of e-voting may seem like
a natural step in the modern world, it is one that should be taken with caution.
This thesis takes a software engineering approach to answer the question “What,
if any, are the barriers to using e-voting in critical elections?”.
1.1 Terminology
Election terminology is prone to ambiguity – some words may be used as both
verb and noun (e.g. ‘vote’), some words can have subtly different meanings (e.g.
‘ballot’ as piece of paper, or ‘ballot’ as set of voting options). We developed
a glossary (appendix A) which gives unambiguous meanings to terms used in
our requirements (see chapters 5 and 6). Words and phrases from the glossary
appear ·like this· wherever we mean the glossary definition to apply.
In the interest of consistency, throughout this thesis “he” will be used as the
gender neutral pronoun to refer to voters (and others) of unspecified gender.
In this thesis we use the term “e-voting” to mean the use of technology in
the collection and/or counting of votes. We use the term “catalogue” to refer
12
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to a set of requirements, or a requirements specification.
As a further defence against ambiguity, the key words shall and should
(where they appear in small capitals) are used as described in RFC 2119
[4], i.e.: shall means that the definition is an absolute requirement of the
specification, while should means that there may exist valid reasons in
particular circumstances to ignore a particular item, but the full implications
must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing a different course. In
the case where a different course is chosen, all reasoning must be made explicit.
1.2 Scope of Research
1.2.1 Critical Elections
This thesis is concerned with what might be termed “critical elections”: elections
which are as important as general elections, presidential elections and referenda.
There are of course many contexts in which (for instance) ballot secrecy is not
essential, or the stakes are not high enough to be concerned about attacks on
the system. Many of the arguments presented here will not be applicable in
those contexts. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt to draw a
line between “critical” and “non-critical” elections. However, it is clear that
elections of national importance (such as those mentioned above) do fit within
the “critical” category.
1.2.2 The Electoral Process
Despite the variety of ways in which modern democracies implement elections,
the following high-level view of the electoral process applies almost (if not
actually) universally.
Voter Registration: a list of ·eligible voters· must be kept so that voting can
be restricted to ·eligible voters·.
13
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Voter Authentication: when a person attempts to ·cast· a ·vote·, they must be
authenticated against the list mentioned above.
Vote Collection: the votes of authenticated ·eligible voters· must be recorded
in a way which preserves secret suffrage (see section 1.6).
Vote Tabulation: results must be calculated based on the ·votes· ·cast· by
authenticated ·eligible voters· according to the appropriate algorithm.
This thesis is concerned with the vote collection and tabulation phases of
the electoral process. While other aspects of the electoral process have seen the
introduction of technology, and may be fruitful areas for research, we chose to
focus on e-voting: the use of technology to collect and count votes.
1.2.3 Technology
Technology might be introduced into this process in numerous ways, and for
various reasons. Here we give a brief summary of the main technologies that
have been used so far with the aim of putting the scope of this thesis in context.
Computerized management of the electoral register
It may be desirable to allow voters the opportunity to vote from whatever
polling place they find most convenient. The best way to do this – without
compromising voter anonymity or adding an excessive administrative burden –
is likely to be the introduction of an accurate, up-to-date, computerized voter-
register that can be securely accessed and modified from any polling place. An
assessment of one such system (run on a pilot basis) is available in [5].
Voter authentication by digital signature
Jurisdictions that have the infrastructure in place may choose to implement
computerized authentication of voters. This requires some kind of electronic
record of voters identities, as well as a means of identifying the voter against
14
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that record (such as an e-identity card). A description of a system which uses
this kind of technology is available in [6].
Electronic vote collection and tabulation
The introduction of technology for these phases of the electoral process is what
is generally known as ‘e-voting’. Though a natural understanding of the term
‘e-voting’ might only include vote collection, e-voting systems inevitably also
count votes. There are two main types of systems used: Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) systems collect votes directly from the voter through a ·vote-
casting interface·, Mark-sense systems (also known as Optical Scan systems)
convert paper ballots into electronic records for tabulation. (Mark-sense systems
introduce a new phase into their electoral process, between vote collection and
tabulation, which might be termed ‘vote format conversion’).
The introduction of technology for vote collection (as in DRE systems)
introduces a requirements conflict between vote secrecy and the accurate
recording of votes (discussed in detail in chapter 3).
Remote voting systems
These systems generally use technology for all stages of the electoral process.
They incorporate an electronic voter register, authenticate the voter remotely,
collect the vote electronically and then calculate the results centrally.
We consider remote e-voting (such as via the Internet) to be outside the
scope of this thesis, because we are concerned here with critical elections. As
Adida says, the enforced privacy of the polling booth is the “only known way to
establish a truly private interaction that prevents voter coercion” [7]. The most
foolproof of security measures is only meaningful if we can prevent someone
from standing beside the voter and watching as he casts his vote.
Besides this fundamental barrier to the use of remote e-voting, there are
many immediate and practical obstacles such as the risk of viruses and trojan
horses on the client computer. See [8, 9, 10] for thorough analyses. For a detailed
15
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discussion of the political implications of remote e-voting, see [11].
1.3 A Short History of Voting Technology
The history of democracy is usually traced back to ancient Greece, but the form
it took then would be barely recognizable as democracy to us today. Suffrage
was extremely restricted, and those few members of society who did have votes
cast them by dropping stones or clay shards into pots. They voted directly on
the topics at hand rather than electing representatives to make those decisions.
While the secret ballot did exist in ancient Greece and was used for certain
kinds of ·polls·, in the modern era viva voce (by voice) voting was normal until
the late 18th or early 19th century. Voters had to publicly declare their votes,
which were written down by election clerks. When the secret ballot was first
introduced ballots were hand-written by voters, cut from newspapers, or handed
out by representatives of candidates.
In 1856, the “Australian ballot” was first introduced in the state of Victoria,
Australia. Votes could only be cast on official ballots which were pre-printed
by the electoral authority bearing all valid voting options. The idea spread
gradually until it became the norm in democracies worldwide.
From the late 1800s, lever and punched card voting machines were introduced
in various places around the US. Lever machines increment internal counters
with each vote cast, keeping no record of individual votes. Punched card
machines read cards that have been punched by individual voters, and those
cards are retained and can be re-read where need arises. In a sense, these two
types of voting machines are predecessors of the two main types of modern
voting machines: DRE (direct recording electronic) and Mark-sense (ballot
scanning) systems respectively. After the problems in Florida during the 2000
US presidential election, many of these lever and punchcard systems were
replaced by DRE and Mark-sense systems. For a more detailed look at the
history of voting technology in the US see [12, 13].
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The use of mechanical voting has never been widespread in Europe, and
e-voting has so far generally taken the form of DRE systems. By European
standards, the Netherlands was a very early adopter (1982), and it was almost
a decade later (1991) that Belgium started experimenting with e-voting. Just a
few years later, in the mid-nineties, France did the same. By the early 2000’s,
experiments or pilots had been run in the United Kingdom, Italy, Spain and the
Republic of Ireland [14], among others.
Opposition to e-voting is growing in many places including Ireland [15], the
UK [16], the Netherlands [17] and the US [18, 19]. These campaigns have,
directly or indirectly, resulted in:
 the suspension of e-voting in Ireland since 2004 (see section 4.2.2)
 recommendations by the UK electoral commission that no further pilots
of voting are undertaken until a comprehensive plan is in place, a central
process is implemented and sufficient time is allocated for planning [20]
 the suspension of all e-voting in the Netherlands for the foreseeable
future [21]
 de-certification in California of e-voting systems from four companies
[22]
 new laws in many US states requiring a Voter Verified Audit Trail
(VVAT – see section 3.5) [23].
1.4 Public Perception, Government Communi-
cation and Reality
The difficulty of implementing e-voting is not generally obvious to the public.
At first glance, e-voting seems to be a simple case of counting. Conflicting
requirements and the differences between implementing e-voting and, say,
electronic banking are not immediately obvious, particularly to people with
no experience of developing mission- or safety-critical systems (see chapter 3).
In the absence of controversy, surveys of voter attitudes usually reflect
17
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satisfaction and trust (for example [24]). When concerns are raised by experts
and in the media, however, public opinion can change dramatically. For
example: in Ireland in 2003 a survey by Ama´rach Consulting found that a
majority of Irish citizens were in favour of the introduction of e-voting [25]. Less
than a year later, after controversy over the system had led to the establishment
of the Commission on Electronic Voting, a Red C survey found that 58% of
respondents felt that “. . . the [e-voting] proposal should be scrapped until such
time as a paper back-up is incorporated into the system . . . ” and “one third of
all voters were unconvinced that their choices will be registered properly” [26].
This instinctive trust of e-voting systems also appears to exist amongst
officials. When government representatives speak about e-voting it tends to
be in very positive terms. Their statements emphasize the benefits of e-voting;
the largest obstacle, from their point of view, is usually gaining the voters’ trust.
The idea that the system in question might not deserve such trust is given little
or no attention, except where it overlaps with “allay[ing] public concern” about
the security of the system [27]. Two prime examples of this are the webpages for
the voting systems of the Irish Government [28] and the Swiss state of Geneva
[29], both of which list advantages of their respective systems without making
any mention of the real security concerns.
In reality, implementing e-voting is not so simple. Mercuri identified [30]
one of the most significant obstacles – the conflict between the requirements for
secrecy and accuracy (discussed in chapter 3). Serious problems also arise from
the way in which voting systems are currently developed (discussed in chapter 4).
To our knowledge there is still no voting system that has been treated as safety-
critical in its development and deployment [1]. The components of the systems
are, in general, proprietary [31, 32]. These and other factors have combined to
create serious issues in legally binding elections. Examples of worrying incidents
in real elections in the US have been gathered by the Election Incident Reporting
System set up by Verified Voting Foundation and Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility (CPSR) [33].
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1.5 International Standards for E-voting
An important step in ensuring that any system behaves correctly is laying
down what behaving correctly means for that system. In other words, we must
identify the system’s requirements. Despite the widespread and longterm use of
e-voting in many places around the world, there does not yet exist a satisfactory
requirements specification for e-voting.
E-voting is a problem that requires multidisciplinary input. Computer
experts are unlikely to understand the social implications of the technology they
design without input from those who have direct experience of running elections.
Civil servants and political and social scientists are unlikely to understand
the complexities and difficulties of designing technology to meet their needs.
Requirements engineering is a vital step in system design and it always requires
input from those for whom the system is being designed (clients – both buyers
and users1) as well as those designing the system.
This thesis does not present a set of requirements based on this type of cross-
disciplinary collaboration. However, many of the existing catalogues appear to
have been developed without adequate requirements engineering expertise. This
has produced requirements that are too abstract or too concrete, and documents
that are internally inconsistent or incomplete (see analysis done in chapter 5 and
[35]). Some catalogues are very much tied to the context for which they were
developed (e.g. [36]). Many of the requirements are impossible to evaluate,
leaving testers with no option but to say ‘maybe’. Most of the requirement
catalogues have not yet been used to evaluate real systems. This thesis does
present two sets of requirements developed with software engineering needs in
mind. Hopefully these requirements catalogues can be a building block for
cross-disciplinary work to produce a valuable set of requirements for e-voting.
International standards exist in many disciplines. They clarify minimum
1The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in the US developed
information security standards for the federal government. Ron Ross of NIST has identified the
“open, public vetting process that involves significant review and public and private comment”
as ensuring that “the standards and guidelines are technically sound, cost-effective, state of
the practice, and can be implemented as required.” [34]
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general requirements, they provide a baseline from which requirements can be
developed for more specific contexts and they pool international expertise. The
need for such international standards for e-voting is one of the primary motiva-
tions for this thesis, and we make some proposals towards the development of
such standards.
Various ‘local’ standards documents have been developed around the world.
In the US the standards were developed originally by the Federal Election
Commission (they are now maintained by the Election Assistance Commission
– EAC). In Europe, the first trans-national e-voting standards were developed
by the Council of Europe (CoE) (see chapter 5 for more details). There are
also numerous standards documents developed for more specific contexts (e.g.
[37, 38]).
However, no catalogue of requirements exists which:
 is generally applicable
 is developed with adequate software engineering expertise
 is useful for the design and evaluation of real systems
 takes evaluation techniques and certification procedures into account.
Of the existing catalogues, the two with the broadest intended scope must
be those developed by the Council of Europe (CoE – see chapter 5) and the
voluntary standards developed at a federal level in the US. There are three
significant differences between the approaches taken towards e-voting standards
in the CoE and the US: timing, takeup and size.
The first two are naturally related. The US has had (nominally) voluntary
standards since 1990. However, many states have passed laws requiring
conformance [35]. The CoE standards remain voluntary. In fact, to our
knowledge, the “certification processes” they call for have not yet been developed
in any European country. It is likely that this is influenced by the difficulties of
certification against the standards (discussed in chapter 5) and by the fact that
e-voting remains less widespread in Europe than in the US. Where e-voting is
used in Europe it is generally on an experimental or pilot basis.
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Comprising two volumes of 12 and 10 documents respectively, totalling
almost 300 pages, the latest US standards are clearly much larger than the
document produced by the CoE, which totals 21 pages (the explanatory
memorandum is a further 67 pages long). As might be expected, considering the
difference in size, the American standards aim for a much finer granularity than
the CoE standards do. For example, whereas the CoE standards make a passing
reference to testing in standard 111, the EAC standards list and elaborate on
five categories of testing.
A standards document must be relevant to system developers and policy
makers. It must be useful in weeding out “bad” systems without rejecting
“good” systems. Unfortunately, neither approach has produced a standards
document that meets these criteria (see the critiques of US standards in [39, 35]
and of the CoE standards in chapter 5).
Despite the variety of ways in which democratic mechanisms are imple-
mented around the world, there is enough commonality to make international
standards feasible and worthwhile. Clearly this thesis cannot propose a complete
set of such standards; their development requires input from experts in many
disciplines. This thesis does, however, demonstrate the need for software
engineering expertise in the development of standards (see especially the analysis
of the CoE standards document in section 5.3).
1.6 Election Principles
Five principles are well established legally as necessary components of free and
fair elections [40] (the need for suffrage to be ‘trusted’ has, until recent times,
been left implicit; here it is included as a fundamental principle). Some of the
following definitions are based on those in [40], though they have been rephrased
in light of the glossary mentioned above (appendix A). These principles will be
used later (chapters 5, 6) to categorize the requirements for e-voting.
Suffrage must be:
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Universal: All human beings have the right to ·cast· a ·vote· subject to certain
conditions, for example age and nationality.
Equal: Each ·eligible voter· has the same number of ·votes·2.
Free: The ·voter· has the right to form and to express his opinion in a free
manner, without any coercion or undue influence.
Secret: The ·voter· has the right, and the duty, to ·cast· his ·vote· secretly as
an individual, and the state has the duty to protect that right.
Direct: The results of the ·poll· shall be determined by the ·votes· ·cast· by the
·voters·.
Trusted: The ·eligible voters· must trust that these principles have been
upheld.
1.7 Structure
This thesis is structured as follows: chapter 2 describes the research questions
approached and the methodologies used. Chapter 3 examines the requirements
conflict between secrecy and accuracy; we discuss the ways in which e-voting
is different to paper voting with respect to that conflict. We then describe the
two main approaches to resolving the conflict for e-voting. Chapter 4 describes
some of the organizational issues with the introduction of e-voting. These issues
include under-use of best practice in the public sphere and legal implications for
electoral rules, results and vendors. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the development
of international requirements for e-voting, the former taking a top-down, and
the latter a bottom-up approach. Chapter 7 lists the contributions made by the
thesis, and chapter 8 discusses future work.
2In certain ·elections·, some ·voters· may have the right to ·cast· more ·votes· than others
(e.g. stock corporations). Such elections are not considered here.
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Chapter 2
Research Questions
The main research question in this thesis is: “What, if any, are the barriers
to using e-voting in critical elections?”. In the introduction, the term ‘critical
elections’ is examined. In the following chapters, several barriers are identified
and discussed. As this is a software engineering thesis the barriers examined
are either software engineering problems, or discussed from the perspective of a
software engineer.
2.1 Analysis
2.1.1 Secrecy versus Accuracy
The first barrier discussed was originally identified by Dr. Rebecca Mercuri [30],
that is the conflict between the requirements for secrecy and accuracy. The sub-
question here could be phrased:
1) “What solutions have been proposed to the secrecy-accuracy
conflict, and are any of those solutions satisfactory for a critical
context?”
In answering this question we asked the following: what is the nature of the
conflict itself? What are the consequences for e-voting specifically (as opposed
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to traditional paper-only elections), especially in dealing with fraud, error and
usability issues? What solutions to the conflict have been proposed, and how do
they resolve the conflict? Are they complete solutions, or mitigation strategies?
Are they easily understood by voters? Are they easy to use? Do they rely
too heavily on trusting individuals? What kind of procedural burdens to they
entail?
Interesting questions which were not addressed include: what would
be the financial cost of implementing these solutions? Do they place an
unreasonable burden on election staff? What is their long-term viability (are
they vulnerable to future scientific or technical breakthroughs)? What is
the relationship between the solutions and international standards (are they
compatible with/required by such standards)? What balance do they strike
between secrecy and accuracy? Can this balance be ‘tuned’? Many of these
questions cannot be answered yet. For instance, since few of these solutions
have been implemented in critical elections, it is very difficult to estimate their
financial cost.
2.1.2 Organizational Barriers
The second sub-question relates to the broader political and organizational
context of e-voting as an information technology system:
2) “What organizational barriers exist in the way that public
bodies procure, use, and otherwise interact with e-voting sys-
tems? What mitigation strategies might prove useful?”
Here we focused on the following questions: given the existence of technical
barriers to the safe use of e-voting in critical elections, why has e-voting been
introduced so widely? Is e-voting an unusual case, or is there a pattern
of difficulty in procuring high-quality ICT (Information and Communication
Technology) systems by public bodies? In the Irish context, what high-profile
examples of procurement success/failure would be useful for comparison? What
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elements of ICT procurement/development best practice were implemented
or not in each case? How did that affect the project outcome? What
work has been done on the problem of procurement in the public sphere?
Has that work suggested useful mitigation strategies? What legal barriers
exist to the successful introduction of e-voting in critical elections? What
are the considerations for the ·responsible election authority· with respect to
the maintenance and verification of systems? How can Independent Testing
Authorities (ITA) help governments procure quality systems? What new
challenges are posed by the selection of ITAs and the work that they do?
The limited availability of information in this area (as discussed in chapter 4)
restricted the questions that could be asked here. It would have been interesting
to examine a greater number of projects, in greater detail. Another investigation
worth undertaking (but obviously beyond the scope of this thesis) would be to
attempt to quantify the effects of mitigation strategies over a large number of
projects.
2.1.3 Requirements
The third and most important sub-question encompasses the majority of the
technical work of the thesis:
3) “Are there deficiencies in existing specifications of require-
ments for e-voting systems in critical elections? What can be
done to address any such deficiencies?”
In answering that question we asked the following: what requirements
catalogues exist? Are there any international standards? How suitable are
such catalogues for the design, development and testing of e-voting systems?
Do they express all the pertinent concepts? Taking the Council of Europe
recommendations as an example, does that specification exhibit common
requirements engineering errors? Can we modify it to reduce the number of
such errors? If we were to propose a new catalogue of requirements for e-voting
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for critical elections, what requirements would we include? How can we make
use of the knowledge encapsulated in existing catalogues to improve our own
requirements? How good are our requirements, and how can we assess their
quality? How can systems be validated against our requirements?
Further questions in this area include: how can the requirements catalogue
be modified and extended to include a broader range of e-voting systems?
What modifications would be recommended or required by election officials and
other interested parties? What are the political implications of the individual
requirements, and what effect might they have on the establishment of a
standards document based on them? What other existing catalogues could
be usefully compared to our requirements?
2.2 Methodologies
We undertook an extensive literature review as a basis for answering all of the
sub-questions under consideration.
Proposed solutions to the secrecy-accuracy conflict form a large part of the
e-voting literature (though not all such authors describe their work that way
explicitly). As a result, this was a theme that ran through much of the research
for this thesis. With respect to sub-question 1) above we analysed the conflict
itself, drawing on the extensive discussion available in the literature. From this
discussion we identified the most important proposed solutions, which fell into
two broad categories – cryptographic, and voter verification. We then examined
each category for fitness-for-purpose for critical elections.
The secrecy-accuracy conflict is one of the “hot-topics” in e-voting. The
analysis included here serves to elucidate the conflict as context for the rest of
the chapter, rather than introducing new ideas. Our description is framed to
highlight why the conflict arises in electronic rather than paper elections, and
why the conflict increases the risk from both malice and error.
It became clear during our research that existing descriptions of crypto-
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graphic schemes for e-voting were very difficult to read for non-cryptographers.
Therefore we included a high-level description of the concepts behind the main
schemes, and simple descriptions of three example schemes, summarizing the
fundamental concepts expressed in the literature in more generally accessible
language. We did not examine cryptographic schemes in greater detail, or
compare their technical merits (in terms of metrics used in cryptography), since
that research is already being undertaken by those with the relevant expertise.
We determined that a discussion of the strengths and drawbacks of proposed
solutions to the conflict would be a useful contribution. Neither cryptographic
schemes nor voter verification proved to be entirely satisfactory solutions; we
identified specific issues with both categories. We did not propose our own
solution to the secrecy-accuracy conflict, however much we would like to be
able to offer an answer to this interesting and difficult problem.
We identified the broader context of e-voting as an ICT system procured by
public bodies as an interesting and under-examined area. However, the lack of
publicly available information on that type of procurement was disappointing,
and limited the possible discussion. In answering sub-question 2) above, we
derived a list of best practice principles from existing work in the area of public
procurement of information technology. Since the available information was so
limited, we did not seek to develop this list particularly rigorously – instead
we sought practices which were common to the three documents we considered
(and therefore well-attested). We identified three case studies from the Irish
public sphere. For each case study we attempted to discover which of the
aforementioned principles were implemented during the project’s lifetime. In
the case of the Revenue Online Service, this required direct contact with some
of the staff involved. We included a summary of mitigation strategies suggested
by extensive research in the UK context for informational purposes.
The publication of the Council of Europe’s standards document for e-voting
prompted our interest in standards and requirements for e-voting. We began
our work in that area by examining that document for common requirements
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engineering errors, and then developing a proposal for improvement. Since some
of the requirements covered more than one concept, the first step was to split
them into sub-requirements (see appendix B). We then rearranged the whole
catalogue to group similar and related concepts together which helped to reveal
inconsistencies, repetitions and gaps in the specification. The requirements
were rephrased to increase clarity and to further reduce the number of common
requirements engineering errors (see section 5.3). Some were deemed to be
incorrect, and were therefore contradicted or left out. Some concepts not covered
by the original specification were considered vital, and were therefore added.
The resulting specification is a step towards the development of the requirements
catalogue called for by sub-question 3).
As a further step towards answering that question, we developed a new
catalogue in a bottom-up manner. The process of developing requirements
involves: elicitation, analysis and negotiation, documentation and validation
[43].
As Sommerville and Kotonya put it “structured methods are not very useful
for requirements elicitation” [43, page 57]. Therefore we relied on the expertise
encapsulated in existing requirements and literature, our own domain knowledge
and methodical, iterative checking during this phase.
We used a modified version of the normal process of analysis and negotiation,
since we did not have direct access to a “client” with whom to negotiate. Instead
we analysed the requirements by re-checking them against existing catalogues
and each other for classic requirements engineering mistakes (see section 5.3).
Those other catalogues encapsulate a great deal of the relevant stakeholder
needs, and therefore went some way towards making up for the lack of direct
negotiation.
Documentation is the process of expressing requirements. It is important
to find “an appropriate level” of expression for a given context. For e-
voting it is necessary that requirements be comprehensible to many people
including lawmakers and election officials, but they must also be useful to
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system designers. We chose to express our requirements in well-defined natural
language (for which we produced the glossary included in appendix A) but with
a formalized structure (see section 6.3).
For validation, we again compared the latest version of our requirements
against existing catalogues (producing the comparison tables in appendix C).
We also developed an “interaction matrix” [43] to discover conflicts and highlight
dependencies between requirements.
As discussed in [44], testing for completeness of requirements specifications
is extremely difficult since “there is no other ‘model’ against which the
specification can be tested; it is only through repeated validation cycles that
one can gain some confidence of completeness.” [44, page 13] Indeed the
steps described above were not undertaken in a strictly separate way, and the
results from one often fed back into another. We can confidently state that
our requirements are more complete than any of the sets against which they
were compared, however, since our catalogue includes necessary requirements
not covered by any of them (see table C.6 in appendix C).
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Secrecy versus Accuracy
Where technology is introduced during the vote-collection phase of the electoral
process, a requirements conflict can arise. This conflict poses a major barrier to
the use of e-voting for critical elections. In this chapter we discuss the conflict
itself, in particular why it does not arise in traditional paper systems. We go on
to examine the two main types of proposed solutions to the conflict, and discuss
their applicability to critical elections.
3.1 The Conflict
At the heart of e-voting there is a requirements conflict, between the need for
accuracy and the need for secrecy [30]. If elections were public events, where
every vote could be clearly traced to its originating voter, e-voting would become
trivial. Take, for example, the voting system used in Da´il E´ireann (the Irish
Parliament). TDs (members of parliament) cast their vote by pressing a button
at their seat. A large display board shows the votes as they are cast, as well
as results. If a TD’s vote is recorded incorrectly he/she is free to stand up and
say so, and have the error corrected. Everyone can see how everyone else has
voted, and everyone can see that his own vote has been recorded accurately.
The secret ballot is not used in such situations because citizens have a right to
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know how their representative votes.
Public elections are very different. Each voter has a right, and a duty,
to a secret ballot. The introduction of the secret ballot was a very important
innovation in the history of democracy; it enforces (in conjunction with effective
voter registration) the rule: one voter, one vote. Since voters must successfully
identify themselves before voting, and since they vote in the “supervised-
privacy” of the voting-booth, each voter can vote the way he chooses to.
Potential vote-buyers or coercers cannot gain extra votes because of their wealth
or power, and their potential victims do not lose their votes because of their
poverty or weakness.
It has been proposed that the secrecy of the ballot is no longer necessary
and should be done away with in favour of more verifiability [45]. This proposal
is flawed. The secret ballot exists more for the benefit of the system as a whole
than for an individual voter; it prevents coercers and buyers from getting “more
than their fair share” of votes. Developed countries with stable economies and
governments must also take two more factors into account: first, other countries
are probably watching and emulating, and second, the stability we enjoy is not
as unassailable as it seems.
Here is where the conflict arises: in any other computer system, transaction
accuracy is ensured by auditability. Online banking is feasible because any given
transaction is recorded along with amounts and identities of all parties involved.
The transaction can be checked for accuracy at a later date. E-voting does not
allow this kind of auditability, because one party to the transaction (namely the
voter) must remain anonymous1. When examining the election for accuracy, we
cannot be certain about the accuracy of the recording of votes, since it cannot
be audited [11].
1In a limited sense, the UK is an exception to this rule. Votes can be traced back to their
originating voter via identifying numbers on ballot papers. This information is considered a
state-secret however, and is only accessible in limited circumstances. For the purposes of this
discussion let us consider the situation in the UK to be effectively equal to other jurisdictions
with stricter definitions of the word “secret”.
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3.2 The Paper System
In the paper system this conflict doesn’t arise. This is thanks in part to
the advent of the Australian Ballot, another significant innovation in the
development of our current democratic structures. The Australian Ballot is pre-
printed by the organizing authority bearing the names of all candidates/ballot
options. The idea is that access to an authentic ballot should only be granted
to authorized voters, and those involved in the count should be able to easily
identify an authentic ballot2. Since the voter has seen the actual record of his
vote that will later be used to calculate results, and since he can be confident
that “pencil doesn’t fade overnight” [46, page 8], he can be sure his vote was
recorded correctly. Similarly, since counters can identify authentic ballots, and
they know that each authentic ballot was seen (and marked) directly by its
respective voter, they can be sure that the votes they are counting were recorded
accurately.
One significant weakness of paper voting systems is that they rely on a
chain of custody to safeguard the integrity of ballot boxes after the close of
polls. Often representatives of various interested parties as well as police officers
supervise the transport and/or storage of the sealed boxes until they are opened
for counting. Unfortunately, this chain of custody is not 100% reliable [47],
though it is certainly better than no chain of custody at all (as we have in
e-voting systems that do not incorporate some mechanism to solve the secrecy-
accuracy conflict).
3.3 What’s Changed?
With the introduction of a computer between voter and vote, we introduce
doubt. A voter cannot see the computations performed within a computer,
and therefore never sees the actual record of his vote. Assurances from the
2A similar system is used in certain European countries where access to the ballot-box is
limited instead of access to authentic ballots.
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computer that “your vote has been recorded”, and even displays of the vote it
claims to have recorded, make no difference. The display of information is a
separate operation from the recording of information, so what is displayed does
not necessarily bear any resemblance to what is recorded [48].
It could be argued that adequate testing would reduce the risk of accidental
error below the risk of accidental error in the paper system, and that therefore
e-voting should be more reliable than paper voting, but there are four important
objections to that argument:
 we must concern ourselves with malice as well as error
 we cannot expect any testing regime to uncover all errors and weak-
nesses.
“Program testing can be a very effective way to show the
presence of bugs, but is hopelessly inadequate for showing
their absence.” – Edsger W. Dijkstra [49, page 864]
Those errors that do occur in e-voting systems will be more difficult to
detect and deal with than those that occur in the paper system
 usability is a more complex question for computer systems than for
paper
 the assumption that adequate testing will be carried out is not always
justified (see section 4.2.2).
3.3.1 Malice
Unfortunately, elections have high stakes, and accidental error is not the only
thing we need to test for. It would not be paranoid to say that there are
numerous individuals and organizations that might want to alter the behaviour
of voting computers to suit their own purposes [47], as recent experience with
postal voting in the UK has proven yet again [50]. The single point of attack
offered by an e-voting system provides a tempting target.
Attacks on the paper system certainly do happen, but the distributed nature
of paper elections limits their scope. In order to affect an election without being
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blatant one would have to spread any attack over many ballot boxes. Each new
ballot box requires new members of the conspiracy.
A successful attack on an e-voting system, on the other hand, could have
very far-reaching implications.
“E-voting machines potentially make electoral fraud unprece-
dentedly simple. An election saboteur need only introduce a
small change in the master copy of the voting software to be
effective.” [51, page 44].
An insider within the vendor company could hide “cheating behaviour” inside
the proprietary and secret source code for voting computers. Someone could
subvert the machine which calculates results. It has even been demonstrated
that some systems are vulnerable to virus attacks which are spread from voting
computer to voting computer [52], potentially subverting the behaviour of most
of the computers in use on election day. Any of these could affect all or most of
the voting computers simultaneously, in all elections in which the devices were
used.
This also applies to attacks on the secrecy of votes. Certainly such attacks
exist in paper systems. Chain voting is a classic example [47]. Early on polling
day the attacker acquires a blank ballot. He then fills in that ballot according
to his preferences. Vote-sellers are given the already filled-in ballot on their way
into the polling place, and paid when they return to the attacker with a blank
ballot (which they were given by polling staff). Of course the scope of such an
attack is limited, the resources required are significant, and vigilance on the part
of election staff should make it difficult in practice. Because of the centralized
nature of e-voting systems, successful attacks on their secrecy are likely to have
much more far-reaching effects.
3.3.2 Error
Errors in the paper voting system are similarly limited in scope. If one ballot
box is misplaced the effects are limited to that constituency. An error which
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caused voting computers to lose all votes of a certain type is likely to affect all
computers, in all constituencies, every time they are used.
Potential errors in counting paper are also limited. Where ballots are hand-
counted there is an assumed margin of error, and facilities for recounts are
standard. However, since we are talking about random error, all candidates
should be equally affected (statistically speaking) and the effects should balance
one another out. Each recount should reduce this margin of error. An e-voting
system, in contrast, cannot offer the facility of a recount without a completely
separate ballot counting implementation. There are applications where one
would expect a computer program to return different results when it is re-run,
but the tallying of election results is not one of them.
In other words, we can assume that hand-counting gives results which are
always at least slightly wrong, but the more times we calculate the results,
the closer we get. E-voting systems give a result which may be 100% accurate,
but which may be wildly wrong (resulting in the wrong candidate being elected)
without being detected. Re-running a hand count should help uncover mistakes,
re-running counting software will only repeat any mistakes. Schneier discusses
these issues in [53].
3.3.3 Usability
E-voting systems have the potential to be more usable than paper, especially
for people with disabilities such as visual impairment or reduced motor control.
Indeed, paper voting systems are not free of usability problems [54]. However,
designing a user interface for a voting computer is a much more difficult task
than designing a good paper ballot. Paper ballots are based on a technology
(paper and pen) that is extremely familiar to people of all ages. They also
interact very simply with the user. In contrast, the very flexibility of e-voting
interfaces that makes them so powerful also makes them much more complex to
design well. It is also worth noting that e-voting systems cannot afford to have
a steep learning curve [55]; citizens in most jurisdictions vote rarely and don’t
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have much opportunity to become familiar with the interface.
A good user-interface must be designed with its users in mind. For voting,
the users are immensely diverse: age, abilities (physical and mental), language,
familiarity with computers, and many more attributes may all be relevant to a
given voter’s ability to use the interface.
A poorly designed voting interface disenfranchises those who cannot use it
(some of whom may believe they have used it correctly). It also jeopardizes the
ballot secrecy of those who need help using it. There is a risk that voters may
stay at home rather than attempt to use a system they are not comfortable
with. Indeed, as the “butterfly ballot” incident in Florida [54] showed, a poorly
designed voting interface can change the outcome of an election.
See Sarah P. Everett’s doctoral thesis [56] for a more detailed analysis of the
problem of usability in e-voting systems.
3.4 Proposed Solution: Cryptographic Voting
Schemes
In this section we discuss the use of cryptographic voting schemes as a means of
overcoming the requirements conflict as a barrier to the use of e-voting in critical
elections. We summarize the design of these schemes, giving a high-level outline
of three example schemes, and then discuss their suitability for use in critical
elections at their current stage of development.
In the long term, cryptography offers the exciting possibility of improving
election verifiability beyond even that offered by tried-and-trusted paper
systems, removing the reliance on chain of custody for security. Though
many cryptographic protocols have been proposed for remote e-voting (e.g.
[57, 58, 59]), polling stations remain an essential part of any voting system
for critical elections, including those that make use of cryptography (see section
1.2.3). In general, the cryptographic systems proposed so far aim for:
 ballot casting assurance – whereby each voter can be certain that his
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vote has been recorded accurately (also known as “voter verifiability”)
 coercion resistance – whereby no voter can prove to anyone else how he
voted (also known as “receipt freeness”)
 universal verifiability of the tally – whereby any observer can verify that
the recorded votes match the published tally.
These aims are achieved by a fundamental design that underlies all the major
polling-site cryptographic voting protocols. The voter casts his vote in a polling
booth. He receives a token (usually a piece of paper) which proves to him that his
vote was recorded correctly, but cannot be used to prove to others how he voted
(coercion resistance). This ‘proof’ is achieved differently in different protocols,
but always involves the publication of votes on a secure, reliable, accessible
‘bulletin board’ in an encrypted form. The voter can check (or allow someone
to check on his behalf) that the token he received is represented on the bulletin
board (combined with verification that his token accurately represents his vote
this gives ballot casting assurance). There is also always some mechanism for
ensuring that the published encrypted votes do indeed tally to the published
result (universal verifiability of the tally).
In these schemes, cryptography is used to maintain the secrecy of the ballot,
and “[a]ccuracy is . . . verified by statistical means.” [60, page 61] using the
concept of “cut and choose”. If Alice and Bob have a cake to share, Alice cuts
the cake and Bob chooses his half. Alice cannot do better than cutting the
cake evenly in two because if one part is larger Bob will choose that part. In
the voting context, cut and choose is usually implemented as follows: someone
(preferably the voter [7]) chooses between two ballot papers, one of which they
use to vote, the other of which they check to see that it would have accurately
recorded a vote. The reasoning is that since the “powers that be” (voting
machine vendors, ballot printers, etc.) could not predict which of the two would
be checked for accuracy, they cannot hope to cheat the system undetected.
Many cryptographic e-voting protocols use mixnets to decrypt votes while
preserving privacy (Adida calls mixnets “shaking the virtual ballot box” [7, page
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38]). Mixnets spread trust over several mutually antagonistic trustees (such as
representatives of the different political parties) to provide certain guarantees
such as: “given that at least one trustee is not corrupt, the secrecy of the ballot
has not been broken” and “no ballots were modified during the mixing process”.
The latter is not provided by all types of mixnet; it may be required, for instance,
that each trustee provide a zero-knowledge proof (proof of an assertion without
giving away any more information than the assertion itself) that his contribution
to the mixnet did not modify any ballots.
For a thorough discussion of the foundational concepts in cryptographic
voting systems (including zero-knowledge proofs and mixnets) see Adida’s
doctoral thesis [7].
To give a better idea of this booth/token/bulletin board design concept, let
us briefly describe three examples: Preˆt a` Voter (Ryan [61]), Punchscan (Chaum
[62]) and Scratch & Vote (Adida [7]). The interested reader may wish to see
two of the earliest such schemes [63] and [64] and Rivest’s ThreeBallot voting
system [65]3.
3.4.1 Preˆt a` Voter
In Preˆt a` Voter [61], ballot options are listed in a random order (which varies
from ballot to ballot) on a detachable tab on the ballot paper (figure 3.1).
The part of the ballot on which the voter fills in his preferences also contains
encrypted information which, in combination with certain secret information,
allows the candidate ordering to be reconstructed. It has been noted that
randomized ballot ordering may adversely affect voters who have pre-planned
their voting [67], and in many jurisdictions the law requires that all voting
options appear in a fixed order.
The voter is assured that the encrypted information does actually represent
the correct ordering (and therefore that his vote will be decrypted correctly)
3ThreeBallot is a work-in-progress attempt to provide the same end-to-end assurances as
these schemes, with similar reasoning, but without the use of encryption (the system has
unresolved security and usability issues [66]).
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Figure 3.1: Preˆt a` Voter ballot with vote cast for Derek
by use of cut and choose. Auditors randomly select half the printed ballots to
be decrypted before polling begins. The chances of an adversary successfully
planting faulty ballots without being detected by this audit are negligible,
especially if they want to plant enough ballots to affect the election. As
explained in [7], however, it would be preferable for the voter to do the choosing
in the cut-and-choose protocol; otherwise the voter must trust whomever makes
the choice.
The detachable part of the ballot (which shows candidate ordering) is
removed and destroyed, and then the part of the ballot paper on which the
voter has expressed his preferences is scanned and marked in some way by
election officials as a valid ballot (this prevents voters producing fake ballots in
order to claim that their vote was not recorded). The official cannot see what
the voter’s preferences are, since the ballot paper no longer indicates candidate
ordering. The voter can take the scanned part of the ballot home as a kind of
receipt (though not one he could use to prove to others how he voted).
Once all ballots have been cast, they are published in their encrypted form
to a public bulletin board where voters (or their representatives) can check
that their receipt is included. Before being decrypted for tallying, the votes
are anonymized via a mixnet and zero knowledge proofs produced to guarantee
that the set of anonymized encrypted ballots corresponds exactly to the set of
published decrypted ballots.
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3.4.2 Punchscan
Punchscan [62] ballots are also formed of two parts, but in this case one overlays
the other (figure 3.2).
(a) top (b) bottom (c) both together
Figure 3.2: Punchscan ballot: top, bottom, both pieces together
The top part has holes in it, through which the lower ballot is visible. The
top part has a list of voting options, each with an associated symbol (usually a
letter). The association between options and letters is randomized and differs
from ballot to ballot. On the bottom part, visible through the holes in the
top part, these symbols are printed (again in a randomized order - independent
of the order on the top part). These ballots go through a similar pre-election
auditing process, where half the ballots are selected at random and checked for
correctness.
To cast his vote the voter finds the letter associated with his preferred voting
option (in the list on the top part), then finds that symbol among the symbols
on the bottom part (visible through the holes). He then uses a “bingo dauber”
or similar device to mark his choice. The dauber should be wider than the hole
so that it marks both the top and bottom parts of the ballot (figure 3.3).
The voter then chooses which part – top or bottom – to keep, and which to
destroy (a second, voter-based, ‘cut and choose’). The former is scanned before
the voter leaves the polling place so that the vote can be included in the tally,
and published on the bulletin board for voters and their representatives to check.
This arrangement would be difficult to adapt to more complex ballots, such as
those where voters express preferences in order. For example, a Punchscan
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(a) top (b) bottom (c) both together
Figure 3.3: Punchscan ballot: top, bottom, both pieces together, with vote cast
for Derek
ballot for PR-STV would have to represent the ballot options in a grid with
preference number on one axis and ballot options on the other (or something
similarly complex) (figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Possible Punchscan ballot for PRSTV
Both parts of the ballot have the same unique ID number printed on them.
This ID number is associated with a row in a special table which allows for
the result to be calculated. Again, this result has an associated zero-knowledge
proof, but this time based on a simplified mixnet [7].
3.4.3 Scratch & Vote
Scratch & Vote [7] is a voting method which can be used with multiple ballot
designs. The basic idea is that the ballot has a scratch surface on it (similar
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to scratch surface lottery tickets). Beneath the scratch surface is enough
information to decrypt the ballot. For example: if Scratch & Vote were used
on a Preˆt a` Voter ballot (figure 3.5), the information under the scratch surface
would allow you to reproduce that ballot’s candidate ordering without requiring
access to secret information (unlike standard Preˆt a` Voter ballots, which cannot
be decrypted by individual voters).
Figure 3.5: Scratch & Vote on a Preˆt a` Voter ballot
Obviously, if the surface has been scratched, the ballot becomes void for
use in the election. It can be used for auditing purposes, however. This
modification has the advantage of bringing the auditing phase into the hands of
voters (and their chosen ‘helper organizations’ [7]) rather than requiring them
to trust election officials to do the audit properly.
In order to create these ballots that can be individually decrypted in this
way, Scratch & Vote uses a special type of encryption called ‘homomorphic
encryption’ [68, 57] which has the powerful advantage of allowing votes to be
tallied without decrypting individual votes. Tallying can be reproduced by
anyone using only the public key, eliminating the need for the trustees required
by mixnet-based protocols.
One disadvantage of homomorphic encryption is that a zero-knowledge proof
is required for each individual vote, to ensure that it will be correctly tallied.
This forces voters to check that a proof has been provided for their ballot.
(Adida proposes that, since these proofs would be too large to include on the
ballots themselves, polling places should be provided with electronic copies that
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voters can check before casting their vote [7]).
A more significant, and indeed insurmountable, problem is that homo-
morphic encryption cannot be used for some of the more complex tallying
systems such as PR-STV (which is non-monotonic [69]), nor can it handle write-
in candidates (which are commonly allowed in the US). While modifications
may be developed for other voting schemes to enable them to handle non-
monotonic electoral systems and write-in candidates, voting schemes which rely
on homomorphic encryption cannot be made to accommodate such systems
(without added-on mechanisms not based on homomorphic encryption) because
of theoretical limitations.
3.4.4 Limitations
Unfortunately, the cryptographic protocols that have been proposed so far have
not yet overcome all of the barriers to their use in critical elections.
Understandability
The most significant of these barriers, and the one that affects all current
cryptographic voting protocols, is the fact that they are so hard to understand.
Voters must be able to trust that their vote has been recorded correctly, kept
secret, and counted correctly. This trust should be based on understanding, not
faith. In the end, asking a voter to trust cryptographers is not any different
to asking him to trust e-voting system vendors. The voter is only protected
from coercion if his vote is secret and he believes that his vote is secret. If the
voter doesn’t understand the protocol, he may be at risk of being convinced by
a coercer that his vote is not secret.
“Democracy not only means an equal right to vote, it also means
an equal right to understand the techniques of voting procedures
and an equal right to prove the results. Democracy includes full
transparency in all its procedures. Thus, in a democracy, all
elements of the voting process (including the software) must –
at least in principle – be easy to follow and to understand for
all citizens. Citizens who agree to give up that right, and to put
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all their confidence in technicians who will judge the security of
computer software in their place, have already agreed to transfer
all power to an aristocracy of a handful of people.”
– Hubertus Buchstein [11, page 50]
Usability
As discussed in section 3.3.3, usability is a major concern in e-voting system
design. Though detailed usability studies are lacking4 it is clear that many of
these systems may pose difficulties for voters. Many of these systems place an
unreasonable burden on the voter, requiring that he complete several steps in
order to cast his ballot. Usability is also related to understanding, since a voter
may find a system more difficult to use if he doesn’t understand how it works.
Reliance on auditors
Most of the systems require that an audit be carried out before polling by
trusted auditors. The level of trust required may be excessive, though it could
be argued that similar levels of trust are required in certain players in a paper
system.
Flexibility
To be broadly useful, these protocols must be compatible with many different
voting methods. Protocols that rely on homomorphic encryption, for instance,
cannot be used for non-monotonic systems such as Ireland’s PR-STV. Nor are
they capable of taking write-in candidates.
The Bulletin Board
The bulletin board (where encrypted votes are available to voters for checking)
must be secure, reliable and accessible. It is “effectively a robust, authenticated
broadcast channel” [7, page 76]. Though it is possible to implement such a
bulletin board (for example, using public-key cryptography), it is an essential
4This lack is acknowledged, in the case of Punchscan, in [70].
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part of these systems, and must not be neglected. Many proposals for
cryptographic voting protocols simply assume the existence of such a channel.
The implementation of this channel could disenfranchise voters (see Usability
above). Indeed, it has been argued that reliance on such technology might leave
certain demographics at a disadvantage when it comes to verifying that their
votes have been correctly recorded [71].
Theoretical limitations
Certain protocols rely on concepts that have profound theoretical limitations.
The democratic implications of these limitations are not always fully understood
by the cryptologists who propose the schemes. An example of this is the
continuing emergence of schemes based on homomorphic encryption (see the
discussion in section 3.4.3 above).
3.5 Proposed Solution: Voter Verification
Unless and until a suitable cryptographic protocol is developed we shall have to
rely on other methods to ensure the verifiability of elections. Perhaps the most
commonly proposed solution is what is known as Voter Verified Paper Ballots
(VVPB) or a Voter Verified Audit Trail (VVAT) [30]. This consists of a tangible
record of each vote cast which has been verified as correct by the voter at the
time he cast it. Effectively, this is an attempt to reuse the solution that works
for paper voting systems: create a record of each vote which is both verified by
the voter and clearly genuine, thus bridging the authentication/secrecy gap.
There are various ways in which this can be implemented. DRE (Direct
Recording Electronic) systems may have printers added such that each voter
views a printout of his vote before the vote is irrevocably cast (DRE+VVAT).
An alternative is so-called “mark-sense” ballots where voters cast their votes on
ballot papers which are scanned.
A correctly implemented VVAT must:
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 comprise ballots verified by individual voters, which must be treated
the same as ballots in the paper system (chain of custody). Where
inconsistencies are detected these ballots must take precedence, since
they have been verified by voters.
 not retain ballot-casting order. Some VVAT systems in use print ballot
details onto a roll of paper. An observer who took note of the order in
which voters entered the booth, and who then had access to the paper
trail, could identify individual’s votes. See [72] for an extreme example.
 be counted and compared to the electronic result in a mathematically
calculated, statistically significant [73], number of randomly selected
constituencies at every election (there would be no point in creating
such a paper trail if it were not checked in a meaningful way).
 have adequate procedures in place to handle any discrepancies between
electronic and VVAT results that do arise, as well as other problems.
There are numerous procedural issues that arise with the use of VVAT.
For instance, where DRE+VVAT is used authorities must decide what should
happen if a voter claims that the voting computer printed the wrong vote. The
claim must be taken seriously, since the computer may be “trying to cheat”, but
the voter may also be lying or simply mistaken. Mark-sense systems have their
own vulnerabilities; for instance, improper calibration of the devices (accidental
or deliberate) could have a significant effect on the outcome of a ·poll· [74].
Above all, the paper trail must be examined in a meaningful way. Whatever
way the record is created, it is clear that it serves no purpose unless it is checked
and its results compared to those from the electronic system. There is ongoing
discussion about how often these records should be checked [73].
Amongst other practical issues with VVAT is the concern that voters will
not actually check the paper records for accuracy. Recent research suggests that
voters do not even check confirmation screens on voting computers for so-called
“vote-flipping” [56]. This is an area that merits further study. How many ballots
are likely to be checked by voters and how many voters would need to check
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their ballots to make an attack statistically non-viable?
Despite these problems, a properly implemented VVAT could raise an e-
voting system’s trustworthiness to the level of existing paper voting systems.
As will become clear in the following chapters, however, it seems unlikely that
governments will be able to procure e-voting systems of high quality and hence
systems with a properly implemented VVAT. It would be wise to concentrate
on improving the way they procure ICT in general (chapter 4) and deciding
what exactly they want their e-voting system to do (chapters 5 and 6) before
introducing new risks into such a sensitive and important area as elections.
3.6 Summary
The requirements conflict between secrecy and accuracy is a significant barrier
to the use of e-voting in critical elections. It increases the risk of undetected,
and uncorrectable, modifications of results by malice or error. It also raises
usability issues.
In the long term, the most attractive solution to this conflict may be the
introduction of cryptographic voting schemes. These schemes have the potential
to improve the accuracy of elections beyond that of traditional paper voting
systems without compromising secrecy. However, they have not yet overcome
all of the limitations which make their use in critical elections undesirable.
In the short term the use of techniques which allow for voter verification,
where properly implemented, may raise the accuracy of e-voting elections
without compromising secrecy. There are important procedural issues, however,
which must be overcome if voter verification is to be used in critical elections.
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Organizational Issues
There are several organizational issues which act as a barrier to the successful
introduction of e-voting for critical elections. In this chapter we highlight the
difficulty faced by public bodies in procuring Information and Communication
Technology (ICT) systems in general. We also discuss the best practice
techniques and mitigation strategies that might help to improve the situation.
We then describe some of the legal issues which arise with the introduction
of e-voting. Finally we look at questions arising for the ·responsible election
authority· because of the need for verification and maintenance of e-voting
systems and the standards that govern them.
4.1 The Problem of Procurement
Why have so many governments introduced e-voting in the face of such – if
not insurmountable, un-surmounted – technical barriers? The answer may lie
in a general difficulty amongst governments in procuring ICT systems. The
discussion below will focus on projects undertaken in Ireland and proposed
mitigation strategies from the UK, but it is unlikely that these problems
are restricted to those two countries – especially considering the widespread
adoption of e-voting without even basic attempts to address the conflict between
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secrecy and accuracy.
ICT procurement is notoriously difficult. According to the Standish group’s
“CHAOS Report” (quoted in [75]) 18% of the private-sector ICT projects they
surveyed in 2004 were “cancelled prior to completion or delivered and never
used”. A further 53% were categorized as ‘challenged’, meaning that they were
delivered “late, over budget and/or with less than the required features and
functions”. Just 29% of the projects they surveyed were categorized as having
succeeded - “delivered on time, on budget, with required features and functions”
(figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: 53% challenged, 29% succeeded, 18% cancelled [75]
Though there does not seem to be an equivalent to the Standish report for
governmental agencies, there is reason to believe that the situation is even worse
in public institutions. Among other things, projects tend to be large, there is
no threat of bankruptcy to encourage the abandonment of failed projects, and
the requirement for public accountability is far greater [76].
4.2 Best Practice
In this section we compare three high profile Irish ICT projects. The aim is
to illustrate the effect of best practice principles on real-world projects in the
public sphere. We begin by enumerating an illustrative (but not exhaustive) list
of best practice principles derived from various sources, including [77, 78, 79].
We then ask which of the listed practices were followed for each project, and how
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successful the project was. The lack of available data (as discussed in more detail
below) limited this exercise, and the results are therefore illustrative rather than
comprehensive.
Our conclusion – that following best practice appears to have a positive effect
on project outcome – indicates that more widespread use of such principles in
the public sphere would be appropriate.
4.2.1 List of Best Practice Principles
1. At the very earliest stages, a clear Vision for the project must be
developed. If the general goals, aspirations and concerns for the
project are not outlined in the beginning, it makes all the later stages
considerably more vulnerable.
2. A Business case can then be developed, including a detailed and realistic
Cost/benefit analysis and Risk analysis. This should be developed
with an open mind to the possibility that the project may have to be
abandoned if the cost/benefit ratio is not satisfactory, or the risks are
deemed too high.
3. At this point it should be ensured that there is adequate Buy-in from all
stakeholders. Without this the project may never meet the needs of the
users for whom it is intended, and/or it may have necessary resources
pulled before completion.
4. Requirements for the project can now be formally defined. This is
a process which requires considerable expertise (if the requirements
document is to be any use to developers) but also requires the input
of future users of the system to ensure that the project built is that
which is required and not simply that which the developers know how
to make.
5. The Clarification of the roles and responsibilities of key players ensures
that no one party is left dealing with all the consequences in the event
of project failure.
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6. The statistics cited above from the Standish report make the need for
ICT project management expertise clear. If these projects could be
run without the support of experts, they would be more successful.
This principle may be particularly difficult for the public sphere, as
governments find it difficult to retain skilled staff in this area [80].
7. A Single responsible owner must be identified to maintain consistency
and direction and to ensure that disputes amongst interested parties can
be resolved, one way or another.
8. It is well established that taking a Modular and incremental approach
to system development and deployment is a useful strategy. Modular
and incremental development allow for unit-testing, can aid bug-
fixing (by helping pin-point the origin of errors) and can provide
some functionality to users before the system is complete. Similarly,
incremental deployment helps “iron-out” unexpected issues that arise
in the real world before large-scale deployment where they might have
more serious consequences.
9. During development the project must be subject to Regular oversight,
including gateway reviews (see section 4.2.6). This helps to identify
problems early and prevent projects spiralling out of control.
10. Contingency arrangements must be developed to cope with the possi-
bility of system failure. This is especially important in mission/safety
critical systems – as many government ICT projects are.
4.2.2 Example Project: E-voting
E-voting was first proposed for use in Irish elections in the late 90’s by
the then Minister for the Department of the Environment, Heritage and
Local Government (Minister for the Environment)1, Noel Dempsey TD. The
Nedap/Powervote system was chosen through a tender process to eventually be
1For historical reasons, the Minister for the Environment has responsibility for the running
of Irish elections
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used nationwide for all elections in the Republic of Ireland. Two pilots were held
in 2002 in local elections and the re-run of the Nice treaty referendum. They
were described at the time as being highly successful, but it was later revealed
that the number of votes recorded varied significantly from the number of voters
marked on the register as having voted. This was attributable to clerical errors,
but the fact that it went unremarked is indicative of some of the problems with
the project.
In 2003 a lobby group called Irish Citizens for Trustworthy Evoting (ICTE)
was formed as opposition was growing to the introduction of e-voting without
adequate safeguards. Pressure from ICTE, opposition parties and others led
to the creation, in 2004, of the Commission on Electronic Voting (CEV). The
CEV was asked to examine the secrecy and accuracy of the chosen system and
concluded in April 2004 (just one month before the system was to be used
nationwide) that it could not advocate the use of the system for the upcoming
elections – citing the fact that deciding in favour of the system’s use had a
much higher threshold than deciding against, and that threshold had not been
reached. They asked for more time to further examine the system, and their
second report was released at the end of 2006 [81]. In that report they outlined
the changes they would require to the system before they could endorse its use
for Irish elections. A notable absence from this list is the requirement that a
VVAT (see section 3.5) be added to the system, even though the report clearly
states that
“Since the chosen electronic system does not have this
facility [VVAT], and while it does provide features to facilitate
a degree of independent audit in its vote counting function,
together with features that facilitate audit at the administrative
level and confirmation of statutory compliance, it is not
subject to any meaningful independent audit of its vote
recording function. Thus the paper system is superior in this
respect.”
(emphasis added) [81, page 154]
After the release of the final report of the CEV, statements from the then
Minister for the Environment Dick Roche TD indicated that he intended the
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system to be used for Irish elections at some point in the future (though it was
unclear whether he intended to implement all of the changes indicated in the
report). The current Minister for the Environment John Gormley TD has not
declared his plans for the system (the Green party, of which he is a member,
has expressed strong opposition to the system [82]) but the Fianna Fail/Green
Party program for government did include the establishment of a permanent
Electoral Commission (as recommended by the Council of Europe [83]) which
would presumably be responsible for such decisions.
Here we evaluate the procurement of e-voting in Ireland against the list of
best practices laid out in section 4.2.1:
1. The introduction of e-voting did not begin with a clear Vision. Reasons
cited publicly for the use of e-voting have repeatedly changed. In the
beginning the system was supposed to save money (this argument was
not based on any actual evidence) and improve Ireland’s image as a
technologically advanced country. It was later argued that the system
would help voters to accurately record their votes. If indeed this had
been part of the original vision it is likely that more care would have
been taken to procure a system with a good user interface.
2. The Comptroller and Auditor General’s report of 2003 indicates that
a business case was developed, but that “the project should have been
subject to a more rigorous cost/benefit analysis in view of the scale of
the financial commitments involved.” [84, page 66] There is no evidence
that any risk assessment was developed before the one produced for
the CEV [85] (which itself is not a formal risk assessment – it does not
clearly define the terms used, nor does it justify assessments made).
3. The existence of ICTE and the resistance to the project from opposition
parties makes it clear that the project did not have Buy-in from all
stakeholders. Every voter and every politician is a stakeholder in election
administration. While one cannot expect the support of 100% of voters
(and therefore it is difficult to determine what buy-in from voters looks
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like) it is hardly too much to expect that such a project would have
cross-party support.
4. The Requirements laid out in [86] were totally inadequate for the
development (or procurement) of an e-voting system which would
safeguard Irish democracy. In fact, the requirements for e-voting have
never been satisfactorily defined. See chapters 5 and 6.
5. The Clarification of roles and responsibilities of key players for this
project can certainly be described as failed. The contracts which were
signed between the vendor and the Minister for the Environment give
the Irish Government no comeback from the vendor should anything go
wrong with the system, amongst other issues [32].
6. There appears to have been a significant lack of ICT project management
expertise. The e-voting project was run by civil servants within
the franchise section of the Department of the Environment. Such
organizations have notorious difficulty retaining trained and experienced
ICT staff [80]. This forced the staff involved to rely on information and
advice from the vendors of the system. Some of the pitfalls of this are
discussed below (section 4.3.3). Another serious consequence was the
lack of adequate testing of the system. For example, prior to the work
of the CEV no end-to-end testing was carried out on the system, and
there was no examination of risks posed by authorized personnel. The
Department staff did not understand what constituted adequate testing,
because they lacked the necessary expertise.
7. Single responsible owner: Unknown.
8. From reports about the counting software it appears that it was not
developed modularly; in fact, even code for different countries seems
to be mixed up together [87]. The incremental approach taken for
deployment – running ever expanding pilots – was a good one, but it
was cut short when the Minister for the Environment decided to move
from using the system in 3 and then 7 constituencies straight to using
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it in all 43. It is important that one is not blinded by the success of
early increments. For instance, the system was never used for more than
one election type simultaneously before the proposed use nationwide in
2004.
9. Regular oversight of the project could have highlighted some of the other
errors that occurred in time for something to be done. Instead, a sense
that the project could not be halted or slowed down seemed to prevail
[88].
10. The lack of Contingency arrangements for the project [84] is indicative
of the excessive level of trust officials had in the system. A total of
7,321 machines were bought [84], which is not even enough to cater
for normal usage, never mind the need for spares. It also appears that
there was no adequate planning for how spares would be transported
to the polling station where they were needed. Planning should also
have been in place for the eventuality of needing to return to paper (e.g.
catastrophic system failure, contract/legal issues with vendor). Paper
ballots were successfully used in the 2004 elections, at short notice,
but it was to be the first use of the system for most constituencies.
Returning to paper after several years of e-voting, even for one election,
would be considerably more difficult. Much of the existing expertise and
knowledge amongst election officials, and the processes in place to run
elections, could be quickly lost.
4.2.3 Example Project: PPARS
The procurement of PPARS (Personnel, Payroll and Related Systems) began
in 1997. It was intended to provide a centralized system for the administration
of human resources within the health services. After several years of exceeding
its budget without providing expected functionality, the project was examined
by the Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) in 2005. It was suspended in
October 2005 pending a review. The report of the C&AG describes some of the
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failures that led to the serious problems encountered by the project. All quotes
and data in this section are from that report [77].
Here we evaluate the PPARS project against the list of best practices laid
out in section 4.2.1:
1. There was a “failure to develop a clear vision of what strategic human
resource management actually meant for the health service as a whole
and for its individual operational units” [77, page 9].
2. Two appraisals carried out on the system in 1998 and 2002 “fell short
of the requirements for a full business case for the project.” [77, page
11] “The first did not adequately address the costs and benefits of the
proposed approach while the second was seriously deficient with regard
to its analysis of costs” [77, page 11] and “the [C&AG’s] examination
found that estimates prepared in the course of the project were not
supported by detailed cost analysis and were mostly framed in the
context of funding requests.” [77, page 11] It does not appear that
a risk analysis was developed in the early stages of the project. Risks
were identified in a report in 2002 “which do not seem to have been
taken on board sufficiently.” [77, page 88]
3. There was a “lack of readiness in the health agencies to adopt the change
management agenda.” [77, page 9]
4. There was an “inability to definitively ‘freeze’ the business blueprint or
business requirements at a particular point in time in accordance with
best practice.” [77, page 9]
5. “The manner in which external consultants and contractors were
engaged to work on this project was unsatisfactory.” [77, page 90]
For example: the “arrangements with Deloitte did not incorporate an
appropriate sharing of risk. In practice, the state carried all the risk.
There is evidence of a lack of clarity regarding the role of Deloitte.” [77,
page 12]
6. The over-reliance of the project on consultants indicates a distinct lack
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of internal expertise. Between 1998 and 2005 e57 million was spent on
consultants and contractors out of a total of e131 million (43.5%). A
budget drawn up in 1998 had allocated e20 million to consultants out
of e109.5 million (18.3%).
7. The C&AG’s report also cited “[a] complex governance structure defined
by a consensus style of decision-making.” [77, page 9] There was a
nominal single responsible owner but “this person did not have the power
to make and enforce decisions across the range of autonomous agencies”
[77, page 11] involved.
8. There was a “failure to comprehensively follow through on its pilot site
implementation strategy before advancing with the roll out to other
[Health Service Executive] areas.” [77, page 9]
9. “The project was reviewed by external consultants on five occasions.
None of the reviews provided a meaningful challenge to the case for
continuing with the project. In fact, the reviews tended to justify the
continuation of the project although a wider review scope might have
focused attention on the escalating cost, reduced scope and the risks to
timeliness and coherence.” [77, page 13]
10. Since the project was suspended in 2005 pending a review, we must
assume that it was possible to function without it. It is not clear,
however that contingency arrangements were a part of the project.
4.2.4 Example Project: Revenue Online Service
The Revenue Online Service (ROS) is certainly a success-story amongst ICT
projects in the Irish public sector. The project won numerous awards, and has
attracted delegations from many parts of the world [89, 90]. It is a system which
allows businesses and individuals to file and pay their taxes securely online.
In their paper called “Revenue On-Line Service (ROS), Ireland’s eGov-
ernment Success Story”, Sean Cosgrove and Conor Hegarty outline some of
the factors they see as having played an important role in that success. [90]
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Throughout the (ongoing) life of the project the maxim ‘Think Big, Start Small,
Scale Fast’ has been used as a guiding principle. The vision for the project was
always ambitious, but early development focused on getting basic functionality
working correctly. Since then, the project has rapidly expanded to cover more
and more transactions.
As discussed in section 4.2.5, this project is the least well described of the
three simply because it was the most successful. More than half of the data
points listed below were acquired through direct contact with ROS staff.
Here we evaluate the ROS project against the list of best practices laid out
in section 4.2.1:
1. An ambitious, but clear Vision was developed at a very early stage
(figure 1 [90]) in the project.
2. A business plan was prepared including a risk analysis and a cost/benefit
analysis.
3. Buy-in from all stakeholders and corporate commitment (which “in-
volves making the best resources available on request”) are listed by
Cosgrove and Hegarty as key to the project’s success.
4. Requirements: Unknown.
5. Roles and responsibilities were clearly defined from the start.
6. ICT project management expertise: Unknown.
7. One of the first steps taken in the project was the appointment of an
ROS Strategy Manager.
8. Modular and incremental approach: “additional taxes and duties are
added to the service regularly with two or three major releases every
year.”
9. Regular oversight : Unknown.
10. Contingency arrangements were in place to ensure that reverting to
paper remained an option.
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4.2.5 Comparison
Table 4.1 gives a summary of these reviews.
Table 4.1: Best practice use in three public sector ICT projects
Principle E-voting PPARS ROS
1 Vision χ χ X
2 Business case X χ X
Cost/benefit χ χ X
Risk analysis χ χ X
3 Buy-in from all stakeholders χ χ X
4 Requirements χ χ ?
5 Clarification of roles and re-
sponsibilities of key players
χ χ X
6 ICT project management ex-
pertise
χ χ ?
7 Single responsible owner ? χ X
8 Modular and incremental ap-
proach
χ χ X
9 Regular oversight χ χ ?
10 Contingency arrangements χ ? X
Success? Postponed Postponed Award
winning
Unfortunately this data can only hint at the significance of these elements of
best practice; it cannot tell us which are necessary and which sufficient nor can
it give us any idea of the importance of these principles relative to one another.
Our survey is limited in scope, both in terms of the number of projects and in
terms of the selected principles.
The data is further limited by the information that is publicly available
on these projects. It is notable that the most successful project of the three
examined (ROS) is the least well described. Both PPARS and the e-voting
system were scrutinized by the Comptroller and Auditor General [77, 84] because
they had in some sense failed, and the results of that examination are publicly
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available. ROS on the other hand has been successful, and therefore never
subjected to such scrutiny. A survey of public sector ICT procurement along
the lines of the Standish Group’s survey of commercial projects [75] could be
extremely useful in mitigating this dearth of information. Data gathered could
be anonymized to prevent embarrassment where projects have failed, while
allowing others to learn from those failures.
4.2.6 Mitigation Strategies from the UK
In addition to the use of best practice, what other strategies might be used to
reduce the effect of this barrier to the successful use of ICT by public bodies
(and hence to the successful use of e-voting)?
As part of an extensive program to investigate and improve governmental
procurement of ICT systems, the UK set up a centralized body called the Office
of Government Commerce (OGC) to oversee the process [91]. Its responsibilities
included “Measurement and benchmarking of procurement performance across
Government”, “Undertaking periodic procurement reviews of procurement
performance, skills and capabilities with Departments” and “Catalysing the
spread of best in class procurement practice”, amongst others [91]. Three of the
most broadly applicable and useful strategies are described below. For a more
detailed description of these measures, and a description of the positive effects
they have had on ICT procurement in the UK, see [79].
Centres of Excellence
Centres of Excellence were set up in the UK “as a means of establishing the
‘right structures and culture’ for successful programme and project delivery
within departments”, with a target for all departments to have one by June
2003 [79, page 30]. A centre of excellence that has the resources to be able
to attract a high calibre of staff [80] provides a focal point for comprehensive
oversight and a repository for knowledge and expertise. It can also assist in
embedding key practices within the department [79].
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Gateway Reviews
Gateway Reviews are one way of implementing regular oversight (see section
4.2). They were introduced in the UK by the OGC in 2001. The National Audit
Office (NAO) define Gateway reviews as “Reviews of civil Central Government
procurement projects and programmes at key decision points by a team of
trained reviewers, independent of the project team” [79, page 74].
The six gateway reviews used by the OGC (as defined in [78]) are:
Gateway review 0 −→ Strategic assessment
Gateway review 1 −→ Business justification
Gateway review 2 −→ Procurement strategy
Gateway review 3 −→ Investment decision
Gateway review 4 −→ Readiness for service
Gateway review 5 −→ Benefits evaluation (repeated as required).
A project is not allowed to proceed beyond a given gateway until reviewers
are satisfied with its progress. This is a useful strategy for preventing projects
from spiralling out of control. It also enforces certain other aspects of best
practice; for example, a project must have a viable business case in order to
pass gateway 1.
Gateway reviews are also recommended by the C&AG in his report on the
PPARS system, stating “Gateway reviews need to be built into the approval
process for major ICT projects and should be independent of the project team.”
[77, page 89]
Red-Amber-Green
In 2002, colour coding was introduced into the gateway review process in the
UK. The meanings [79] of the three colours used are:
Red – To achieve success the project team should take action immediately.
Amber – The project should go forward with actions on recommendations to
be carried out before the next OGC Gateway Review of the project.
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Green – The project is on target to succeed but may benefit from the uptake
of recommendations.
This gives a clear indication of the level of concern held by reviewers of the
project.
4.3 Legal Implications
The introduction of technology is often seen as necessary to progress, and
therefore in some way unstoppable. All too often, however, little consideration
is given to the new challenges – legal, political and sociological – posed by
technology. Besides the outstanding fundamental technological issues discussed
in the previous chapter, and the lack of compliance with best practice in the
public sphere discussed above, there are also other very serious barriers to the
successful use of e-voting.
The introduction of e-voting raises questions about the legal position of the
electoral rules, the electoral results and the vendors of the system. It is vital that
the law moves to meet the new challenges posed by introducing new technology.
The legal position of Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs) is discussed in
section 4.4.
4.3.1 Electoral Rules
The Irish Electoral Act [92] 1992 is the current legislation governing the rules
by which votes should be counted in Irish elections. The act outlines the
particular form of Proportional Representation - Single Transferable Vote (PR-
STV) mandated in the Irish constitution, including the specific rules to be
followed during counting. Thus the Irish Electoral system was completely
described in law.
Since the introduction of enabling legislation for e-voting in 2001, the rules
for deciding Irish elections are no longer necessarily dictated solely by the
relevant law. Where e-voting is used, the software that counts the votes is in
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fact the final arbiter. If the e-voting system chosen for use in Ireland were used,
under current agreements between the Irish Government and Nedap/Powervote,
this would lead to an extraordinary situation. The count rules would no longer
belong to the Irish people, no longer be public and would be subject to change
without legal procedures (when the software is modified or updated).
The Electoral Law has been interpreted by the Department of the Environ-
ment in a document called the “Count Rules” [93]. This document served as the
user specification for the programmer of the Nedap/Powervote count-software.
No other documentation exists except the application itself which is in some
150 to 200 modules of Borland Delphi code. The overall codebase is 200,000
lines of code originally established for use in the Netherlands [94, 95]. It has
been modified for use in Germany, in Ireland, in the UK and in Brest, France.
Reviewers’ comments [87] indicate that there is no separation between the UK
and the Irish code base for certain modules. This is a very dangerous practice
since the electoral rules are completely different in the two countries – the UK
uses first past the post whereas Ireland uses PR-STV.
4.3.2 Electoral Results
In most jurisdictions the law required that paper ballots be kept for a minimum
period (in Ireland, six months) in provision for disputes arising. In such cases, a
court could require that the paper ballots be re-examined. A similar provision
has been made within the electronic system, but as the only records of votes
cast would be electronic, the only evidence which could be presented in court
would be electronic evidence (or a printout of electronic evidence, which is of
course no more reliable). It is difficult to have electronic evidence admitted in
a court of law [96] and rightly so, since it is so much more easily manipulated
and tampered with.
The legal position of electronic ballots has not been tested in any Irish court,
nor to our knowledge in any European court, but the possibility that results
could be successfully appealed on this basis should certainly be considered.
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4.3.3 Vendors
E-voting systems are different from other software and hardware products,
because of the vital role they play in the democracies where they are used.
It makes sense therefore that the vendors of such products should be treated
differently. The commercial interests of those companies cannot be allowed to
take precedence over democratic interests.
Perhaps the most obvious conflict between these interests is in the matter
of trade secrets. Normal practice within the software industry is for software
developers to keep the source code for their products secret. The same applies
to all the documentation produced during the development process, including
design documents, and test strategies and results.
If the public is to be satisfied that the system was well-developed and does
what it is supposed to do, this documentation must be made publicly available,
so that those with the skills to examine its quality have that opportunity. While
this approach prioritizes public interests over private, it is not all negative for
the company. There are many successful businesses today who use the open
source model [97].
A further conflict of interest is this: if there is a flaw in the system it is very
much in the public interest that such a flaw be discovered and corrected. This
would be bad publicity for the vendor, however. Unfortunately it is not safe to
assume that a business will put the correct working of democracy ahead of its
own reputation. Therefore it must be made as difficult as possible for vendors
to deny or ignore flaws in the system. Again, this requires the highest level of
public scrutiny.
The ownership of source code and similar materials (such as design
documentation) is another important issue where standard industry practice
conflicts with the best interests of the public. Usually software vendors sell
licences to use pre-compiled versions of their product and retain copyright of
the code itself. However, if the source code were owned by the people instead
of the vendors, we would be protected from at least two extremely undesirable
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scenarios: the case where a vendor or vendors go out of business, and the
possibility of vendor refusing to comply with the government’s wishes. First,
should the vendor go out of business, the future of our e-voting system would be
considerably more secure. There being no doubt as to the ownership of the code,
the government would be considerably freer in their choice of a replacement
vendor. Second, since the government would be in a position to switch to a
competitor, the vendor could not make unreasonable price increases or other
undesirable policy changes, nor could they refuse to make alterations/updates
to the software.
The contract between Nedap/Powervote and the Irish Government explicitly
retains ownership of the embedded software in the voting machines for
Powervote.
Clause 10.1.2 Notwithstanding the vesting of ownership of the
Ordered Equipment in the Customer, the Customer and Return-
ing Officers acknowledge that the Embedded Software remains
subject to a licence granted by the Suppliers and no transfer
of ownership of the Embedded Software shall occur, including
but without limitation any Intellectual Property Rights in the
Embedded Software. The Customer and Returning Officers
acknowledge that the Embedded Software is the Confidential
Information of the Suppliers. [98]
This is a reversal of the position laid out in the original request for tenders.
Clause 8.4 All software paid for and developed to Department’s
specification will be the property of the Department. [86]
The Irish Government had to provide an indemnity to the Commission on
Electronic Voting in case the source code it examined fell into the hands of
competitors [99]. To have allowed such a situation to develop shows a significant
failure on the part of the Department of the Environment to set out clear
expectations that it should own any software developed for elections. The cost
of the software is estimated to be e467,000 for the counting system.
It is vital that these potential conflicts of interest are recognized and
addressed by those introducing e-voting. It is not good enough for a government
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to rely solely on the advice, opinions and information provided by vendors.
These must all be scrutinized by experts with no personal or commercial interest
in the system.
The establishment of Centres of Excellence should provide decision making
bodies with enough expertise to ensure that their own interests (and thereby
the interests of those they serve) are not secondary to the interests of vendors.
As illustrated by the PPARS experience, hiring consultants to advise does not
necessarily solve this conflict of interest.
4.4 Verification and Maintenance
The final organisational issue discussed here is the verification of e-voting
systems against requirements, and the maintenance of both the systems
themselves, and the standards where those requirements are defined. We discuss
the considerations that arise for the ·responsible election authority· with respect
to evaluation (section 4.4.1), maintenance (section 4.4.2) and Independent
Testing Authorities (section 4.4.3).
The problem of defining requirements for e-voting will be discussed in
detail in chapters 5 and 6, but identifying requirements is not enough. Those
requirements must be fit for purpose: they must meet users’ needs, and they
must be genuinely useful for improving and validating the systems in question.
One serious failing of many existing requirements catalogues for e-voting
is the lack of provision for verification and maintenance. For instance, of the
catalogues mentioned in chapter 6, the CoE requirements call for “certification
processes” [40, page 20] without going into any detail about those processes.
They make no mention of maintenance other than a brief note stating that
the CoE “may look again at this issue two years after the adoption [of
these requirements]”. (The requirements were adopted in 2004). The PTB
requirements [38] explicitly avoid the evaluation process. Again, the only
reference to maintenance is brief: “[f]uture technical developments and new
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experience gathered in general as well as from particular threats may lead to
amendments or extensions of this catalogue.”
The development of a standards document should never be considered
“complete” since technology is constantly changing, as is our understanding
and expectation of that technology. Standards documents must make provision
for their own maintenance in such a way that the verification based on them
is not compromised. They must also make provision for the maintenance of
the ·e-voting systems· covered (such as identifying under which circumstances
recertification becomes necessary) as vulnerabilities come to light, requirements
change, and new technology becomes available.
4.4.1 Evaluation
In [42] we presented an earlier version of the requirements in chapter 6. In
that paper we proposed that the security and assurance requirements could
be evaluated according to the Common Criteria (CC) methodology. However,
as Mercuri has pointed out [30], the CC does not provide a mechanism for
dealing with conflicts within requirements such as the conflict between the
need for secrecy and accuracy in e-voting (see chapter 3). Further, the CC has
recently come under criticism for being costly, slow, and focusing too much on
documentation rather than the product itself, among other things [100]. Here,
instead, we attempt to identify appropriate testing methodologies. In table C.6
at least one of the following testing methodologies is assigned to each of the
requirements developed in chapter 6.
Usability Testing
Usability is a concept that is difficult to define precisely. Usability requirements
are at risk of being defined vaguely, and therefore inadequately tested (see
subsection 4.4.3). This is the reason that terms such as user-friendly and
understandable have been marked as ·responsible election authority· variables in
their respective requirements (meaning they must be defined within a specific
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context). In fact, usability cannot be defined without reference to the users
themselves. Therefore evaluation against usability requirements necessitates the
use of sociology-style experimentation with suitably representative test subjects
[101]. Usability testing is an established discipline in its own right [102].
1. The ·e-voting system· shall be subjected to usability testing.
Election Observation
Organizational requirements are unusual, in that they cannot be met by the
system outside the context of an actual election. They do not describe properties
of the system in the abstract, but properties of the system as it is implemented
on election day. However, they are more than mere guidelines for the ·responsible
election authority·; they are very important assumptions about the environment
which must be met to ensure that the system as a whole meets the broad
election principles (see section 1.6). Therefore someone must check that these
requirements are being met while the election is being run. We propose that the
work of existing election observation organizations [103, 104] can be extended
to cover these requirements, though teams will have to include computer science
experts in order to make judgement calls on certain requirements. For example,
a minimum level of expertise would be required to judge the adequacy of the
cryptographic key management policy called for by Org 2. The Carter Center
has recently published a draft methodology for the observation of new voting
technologies [105].
2. Election observers shall check that organizational requirements and
relevant assurance requirements have been met. Where a VVAT is
implemented, observers shall check that VVAT-requirements have been
met.
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Manufacturer Compliance
Certain requirements seem simple to evaluate since the ·manufacturer· either
complies or does not comply. However, it is vital that the quality of the
documentation produced by the ·manufacturer· is also evaluated. For example,
the ·manufacturer· cannot truly be said to have met requirement Assur 7 unless
the testing conducted meets accepted best practice. We have assigned the
responsibility for ensuring compliance to the ·independent testing authority·.
3. The ·independent testing authority· shall ensure that the
·manufacturer· complies with all relevant requirements and shall assess
the quality of all documentation produced.
Other Tests
There are many other types of testing that should be carried out on an ·e-voting
system· beyond that testing undertaken by the ·manufacturer· (Assur 7). These
include:
Code reviews - examining the source code of the various software components
of the system for adherence to accepted best practice (e.g. readability and
modularity).
Functionality testing - testing the functionality of components to ensure they
meet individual requirements.
End-to-end testing - testing the whole system as it will be used during
elections. This kind of testing is vital to ensure that all components interact as
expected and that the system as a whole is working correctly.
Environmental testing - testing the ·election devices’· resistance to being
dropped from a height and to extremes of temperature, humidity, and so on.
4. The ·independent testing authority· shall conduct code reviews,
functionality testing, end-to-end system testing and environmental testing
to ensure that security, functional and audit requirements are met.
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Red Team Testing
The term “Red Team” originates from the name for the opposing force in
military simulations. These simulations allow commanders the opportunity
to test plans and concepts against an opponent that poses no actual threat.
The Red Team’s objective is to beat the commander’s strategy so that the
strategy can be improved before being tested against a real enemy. The term
has come into common use in computer security for a type of testing also known
as penetration testing. The objective is similar: the Red Team must have
access to the system in a realistic scenario and attempt to break its security.
It must be noted that the failure of a Red Team to break the security of a
system does not necessarily mean that a real attacker would also fail [106]. To
paraphrase Dijkstra [49], testing can only show the presence, never the absence
of vulnerabilities. However, Red Team testing can be a very effective way of
discovering vulnerabilities, and if the Red Team is competent, can increase
confidence in the system.
5. Red Team testing shall be employed to attempt to discover security
flaws in the ·e-voting system·.
should Requirements
As discussed in section 6.3, some of the requirements allow for a certain
amount of flexibility. They use the keyword should to recognize that
it may be undesirable or infeasible to meet that requirement in certain
circumstances. Those circumstances must always be made explicit, however,
since the requirements have been included for a reason, and should not be
simply dropped because they are inconvenient.
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6. For each requirement containing the keyword should where the
should clause is not met, the ·responsible election authority· shall
ensure that an explicit justification is provided. The ·responsible election
authority· and election observers shall assess those justifications for
validity.
4.4.2 Maintenance
Error Correction: Procedures and Responsibilities
Since the whole development process is in human hands, it is prone to
human-error. This applies to both the requirements and the systems they
describe. Errors will almost certainly be found (and will certainly exist) in
the requirements themselves, and in design, implementation, testing and use of
systems. Therefore we must design procedures for dealing with these errors,
including the identification of responsible parties.
Timing is very important. If a grievous error is discovered between elections,
there may be time to deal with it before the system must be used again. There
may be much more serious consequences if it is discovered just before an election,
or worse, just after an election has been completed. Someone must decide how
serious a given error is, and how it should be dealt with in the short, medium
and long term. The question of who must make those decisions is discussed in
section 4.4.3 below.
Other Types of Change
Error discovery is not the only agent of change for requirements and systems.
For example, the introduction of new legislation (national, transnational or
international), or new elections types, may have direct consequences. The
fact that so many types of legislation and sources of requirements exist
raises the possibility of conflicts and inconsistencies arising (apart from the
fundamental requirements conflict identified in chapter 3). The development of
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new technologies may also necessitate the modification of requirements and/or
systems.
A Long Term View of Testing
Whenever a system changes, whatever the surrounding circumstances, it must
be tested and certified again. If the system of evaluation and testing has been
well-engineered, however, it may not be necessary to “begin again” with every
modification. If the ·e-voting system· under examination has been subjected
to critical-system development methods, we should be able to make use of test
re-use and regression testing (testing for unintended consequences of software
changes) to shorten the re-certification process.
The design of the evaluation process must make provision for the ownership,
legal status, and expected lifetime of the system and its components as well as
the expected frequency of use and time between tests.
4.4.3 Independent Testing Authorities
The responsibility for these questions will ultimately rest with the ·responsible
election authority· and their nominated Independent Testing Authority (ITA).
International standards exist in a wide range of disciplines such as telecommuni-
cations, medicine and transport. These standards are documented and enforced
by their respective standards bodies. Additional rigour can be added to this
process by requiring accreditation for the responsible agencies themselves.
However, for such accreditation to be meaningful it must be possible for
these agencies to do their job – to measure systems against their requirements.
That means that the requirements must be expressed in a testable way. Jones
has identified two weaknesses in the ITA process as used in the US [107]: first,
requirements that are vague or subjective are more difficult to test, and ITAs
may give them minimal attention; and second, if a requirement is not made
explicit in the specification, no matter how obvious it may seem, the ITA cannot
be expected to test for it.
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It must also be possible to determine whether a given agency can do the job.
Clearly then requirements documents must not only say what standards are to
be met, but must also state the minimum requirements expected of any testing
agency. Without this additional safeguard one increases the risk that a system
is procured, is passed for use by an independent agency, and subsequently fails
to meet the required standards. In such a scenario it is very difficult to identify
which actor is responsible for the system failing after deployment. ITAs must
be competent, independent and objective, and they must be seen to be so.
The whole system of testing and accreditation must be designed in such a
way that ITAs have more incentive to fail bad systems than to pass them, and
to pass good systems than to fail them. The results of their tests should be
made public, to increase public confidence in those results. It is also vital that
provision be made for de-certification of systems that have been shown to be
faulty [108].
It is worth noting that cost may have a direct effect here. If certification is
expensive for vendors, and maintenance of their systems requires recertification,
there is a risk that vendors will not make necessary changes to their systems
(to avoid recertification) or will make changes without having the systems re-
certified.
4.5 Summary
Public bodies appear to have particular difficulty in procuring high quality ICT
systems. There are various reasons for this situation, and various strategies
which might help. The use of best practice techniques appears to have a positive
effect on project outcome (though the evidence presented here is observational).
The techniques proposed by the UK’s Office of Government Commerce are
based on more available evidence and appear to be having positive effects since
their introduction there. Any success in improving ICT procurement in general
should naturally increase the chances of successful procurement of a high quality
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e-voting system.
There are legal implications specific to the introduction of e-voting (as
opposed to ICT systems in general) that result from the nature of both the
technology in question and the electoral system. The legal implications for the
electoral rules, electoral results and system vendors must be carefully examined
by the responsible electoral authority when procuring an e-voting system.
Finally, standards for e-voting must make provision for verification and
maintenance (both of the systems and of the standards themselves). Otherwise,
the natural evolution of technology and law will become a barrier to the
successful use of e-voting.
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Chapter 5
Requirements for E-voting:
Top-down
Before we can ensure that any system behaves correctly, we must define what
“behaving correctly” means for that system. In other words, we must identify
our requirements for that system. The lack of an adequate requirements
definition for e-voting prevents us from determining the quality of a given
system, and is therefore a barrier to the use of e-voting for critical elections.
There are certain types of errors that are common in requirements specifi-
cations, and that have a negative effect on their usefulness for developing and
testing systems (see section 5.3). In this chapter we analyse a specific e-voting
requirements specification for the presence of such errors, and make a proposal
for how the number of those errors could be reduced. For that purpose, we took a
top-down approach (described in section 5.5 below). The resultant requirements
specification is not proposed as a finished product, rather it is intended to
highlight specific examples of the type of problems encountered in existing
requirements specifications. Chapter 6 will broaden the discussion to other
requirements catalogues, and propose another set of requirements developed in
a bottom-up fashion.
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5.1 The Council of Europe Standards for E-
voting
The Council of Europe (CoE) is an organization of 46 member states, from in
and around Europe. It is not directly connected to the European Union (EU),
though all current EU member-states are members of the CoE. According to its
statute, the CoE aims to
“. . . achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose
of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are
their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social
progress.” [109]
With respect to voting the CoE has a clear purpose in protecting democracy,
the rule of law, and human rights.
The Multidisciplinary Ad Hoc Group of Specialists on legal, operational and
technical standards for e-enabled voting [110] was set up by the CoE in early
2003:
“. . . to develop an intergovernmentally agreed set of standards
for e-enabled voting, that reflect Council of Europe member
states’ differing circumstances, and can be expected to be
followed by the ICT industry.” [110]
The document they produced [40] (from now on referred to as “the
standards”) acknowledges that it cannot be judged in isolation. It states that
it should respect:
“the obligations and commitments as undertaken within existing
international instruments and documents, such as [. . . ]”
The list of 12 instruments then enumerated — though it is clearly not meant
to be exhaustive — covers a diverse range of documents, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the European Charter of Local Self-Government
and the Convention on Cybercrime. It also includes the Code of Good Practice
in Electoral Matters [83], which was produced by the Venice Commission 1.
1The European Commission for Democracy through Law is an advisory body appointed
by the CoE. As it meets in Venice, it is commonly called the Venice Commission.
77
CHAPTER 5. REQUIREMENTS FOR E-VOTING: TOP-DOWN
This inter-related set of complex documents is analogous to a software system
which has evolved over time, in response to ever changing sets of requirements.
The system depends on a large number of other systems, and the environment of
the system (the context in which it is being used) is not clearly understood. With
such legacy systems, one often reaches a stage where the system’s operation can
only be maintained through a restructuring (re-engineering) of the system and
its architecture. Many techniques exist for this task, one of which is known
as reverse engineering. We propose reverse engineering of the standards, with
focus on arriving at a document that can be usefully applied at the requirements
capture stage of e-voting development.
In September 2004, the CoE’s Committee of Ministers officially adopted the
standards. This trans-national effort was a step in the right direction, but the
set of standards developed is seriously flawed.
5.2 Motivation
To strengthen our argument that the standards should be re-engineered, we
analyse whether they – as they are stated – adhere to good practice with respect
to system analysis and requirements engineering. Our goal is not to say whether
we agree or disagree with the standards. Our aim is to show that the way in
which the standards are expressed is very poor, in the sense that it makes it
almost impossible for them to achieve both their objectives, as defined by the
CoE, and our objectives, as outlined in this chapter. The second part of our
technical work will be to analyse the possibility of re-engineering the standards
in order to improve the way in which they are expressed. We demonstrate that
a simple restructuring is an inexpensive first step in the reverse engineering
process.
The standards, as they stand, are not ambitious in the sense that they do
not aim to meet particularly challenging quality criteria. In fact, the specific
role (requirements, if you like) of the recommendations are stated in a generic
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form. Consequently it is difficult to answer the question of whether they are
doing a “good” or “bad” job, since we have only a poor statement of the job
that they are supposed to do.
5.3 A Software Engineer’s View
In [111] Meyer lists the “seven sins of the specifier” – common requirements
engineering mistakes that have a negative effect on the usefulness of specifica-
tions that exhibit them. In this section we introduce the same concepts phrased
positively as key properties that a good requirements model should exhibit, and
we demonstrate – with a small number of examples – how the current set of
standards does not adhere to them.
We first examine consistency: does the standards document use (interpret
and give meaning to) notation and terminology in a consistent way, does it
have contradictory standards, and do the standards contradict the other set of
instruments that precede the document? (Meyer’s “sins” against consistency
are ‘contradiction’ and ‘ambiguity’.)
Next we ask if the standards are complete: are there some existing e-voting
systems whose adherence to the standards cannot be ascertained because the
standards are not broad enough, and are there some aspects of e-voting system
behaviour, in general, that the users are interested in but are not mentioned in
the document? We also ask if there are some aspects that really don’t need to
be included as they are either outside the scope of e-voting, or they are in the
scope of e-voting but adequately addressed by the other instruments. (Meyer’s
“sin” against completeness is ‘silence’.)
The next property that we address is that of the level of abstraction of
the standards: if the standards are too concrete (over-specified) then they
will exclude potentially good e-voting systems (that meet user requirements)
because they are not implemented in a particular way or using a particular
technology; similarly, if they are too abstract (under-specified) then there is no
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obvious mechanism for deciding if a system meets the requirement and so the
standard will fail to exclude systems that appear not to meet a requirement
due to uncertainty. (Meyer’s “sins” against correct levels of abstraction are
‘over-specification’ and ‘wishful thinking’.)
Next, we examine whether the standards embody a clarity of expression –
where the goal is to say things as simply as possible – and so we ask if there is
too much repetition. (Meyer’s “sin” against clarity is ‘noise’.)
Finally, we ask if the document is easily changed and updated. Are there
some things that are likely to change in the future, that will require changes to
the standards, but whose change will be very difficult and costly to manage? If
so, the standards are not maintainable. (Meyer’s “sins” against maintainability
are all those listed above, plus ‘forward-reference’.)
5.3.1 Consistency
The CoE recognizes that consistent use of terminology is key, and states:
“In this recommendation the following terms are used with the
following meanings: [. . . ] [40, page 8]”
The terms that it chooses to define are: authentication, ballot, candidate,
casting of the vote, e-election or e-referendum, electronic ballot box, e-voting,
remote e-voting, sealing, vote, voter, voting channel, voting options and voter’s
register.
However, even in this short set of “definitions”, fundamental terms are used
inconsistently. For example, the voter’s register is not defined as a list of voters,
it is defined as a list of persons entitled to vote (electors). Consequently, in
some instances later in the document, the term elector is used inconsistently to
refer to a voter; this may lead to confusion between a person who is entitled
to vote and a person who actually does vote. Another potential problem arises
because the term ‘vote’ can be used inconsistently as both a verb and a noun.
This can lead us to two different, yet reasonable, interpretations of some of the
standards.
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A different type of inconsistency arises when undefined terms are used in the
definitions and these terms appear to be inconsistently used. For example, the
“casting of a vote” definition refers to the ballot box. Only “electronic ballot
box” is defined and its definition does not refer to a “ballot box”. However
“ballot” is defined. Thus, in the standards, the term “ballot box” can be
interpreted as being “electronic” or otherwise when the difference between them
is not made explicit.
The definitions that the CoE provide demonstrate that they realized that
consistent use of terminology is important. However, they also suggest that
they did not get adequate expert advice as to how these definitions would have
been handled during analysis and requirements capture of an e-voting system.
Surprisingly, one of the most common expressions in the standards is that of
“e-voting system”, yet “system” is never defined.
To conclude, the poor specification of the fundamental concepts actually
increases the likelihood of internal inconsistency in the standards document. A
quick reading of the related standards instruments (mentioned in section 5.1)
shows the same inconsistent use of terminology and so it is also unlikely that the
standards document will be externally consistent with these other documents.
The glossary of election terms in appendix A was developed to help avoid
this kind of confusion and inconsistency.
5.3.2 Completeness and Scope
Many e-voting systems allow for multiple ·polls· to be run concurrently and for
a voter to ·cast· more than one ·vote· when attending a voting station. This
aspect of the system-voter behaviour is not well covered by the standards and
is just one example of how they are incomplete.
In contrast, many of the standards address issues that are not specific to e-
voting and have already been addressed in other “instruments”. For simplicity,
these should have been left out of the document. For example, standard 39
states:
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“There shall be a voters’ register which is regularly updated.
The voter shall be able to check, as a minimum, the information
which is held about him/her on the register, and request
corrections.” [40, page 13]
This requirement is adequately covered in the CoE’s own Code of good practice
in electoral matters [83] which is a much more appropriate document.
In particular, the inconsistent use of terminology means that keeping such
standards within the document increases the risk of introducing ambiguity into
their interpretation.
5.3.3 Over-Specification — Too Concrete
Over-specification is easy to identify as it usually manifests itself in a sentence
of the form: “you must use X because X does Y”. Clearly, a requirements
document would be better saying “you must do Y”, and it could even state “and
X is an alternative way of guaranteeing Y”. Otherwise, if we had a machine that
“uses Z to do Y” then this machine would be rejected even though it met its
requirements.
An example of this is standard 66:
“Open standards shall be used to ensure that the various
technical components [. . . ] interoperate.” [40, page 15]
5.3.4 Under-Specification — Too Abstract
Under-specification is easy to identify as it usually corresponds to the expression
of an idealistic goal, leaving the reader with no idea of how one could check
whether a given system actually meets the goal, or even if such a system could
exist.
An example of this is standard 65:
“The presentation of the voting options shall be optimised for
the voter.” [40, page 15]
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5.3.5 Redundancy and Repetition
In the restructuring of the standards proposed in the following section, it
becomes clear that many of the requirements are repeated across many of the
sections. This is one of the biggest weaknesses of the document. Where terms
are used unambiguously, and interpretation of terms made consistently, then a
certain amount of redundancy can strengthen a requirements document due to
a type of internal self-verification and intuitive error correction. However, in
the standards document, as presented, this redundancy and repetition increases
the risk of the underlying requirements model being misunderstood. See section
5.6.2 for an example.
5.3.6 Maintainability and Extensibility
A good requirements document that exhibits all the desirable qualities that
we mention above is very likely to be easy to maintain. We argue that the
CoE standards document will be difficult to maintain and extend for two main
reasons. Firstly, the faults described above make it difficult to use, and if it
is not actually used in the day-to-day process of maintaining e-voting systems
then it is likely that no-one will see the need to maintain it. Subsequently —
as it becomes more and more outdated — the cost of maintenance will rise
dramatically.
Secondly, the document is almost impossible to maintain because its
structure is such that small advances in technology or small changes to our
understanding of e-voting machine requirements will almost certainly require
large changes to the document. Furthermore, this will make it very difficult
to manage the conflict that arises when manufacturers want to introduce new
technology, governments want to adopt it, and voters do not trust it.
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5.4 CoE Recommendations: an Ambitious Pro-
posal
A more ambitious approach would be to first identify the criteria against which
the standards can be judged – to more explicitly state what “job they are
supposed to be doing” – and then to re-write the standards in order to better
meet these criteria. We propose that a good starting point would be to consider
the requirements that the standards should meet, and to orient this analysis
towards alleviating the main problems that have arisen because such standards
were not in place when many of the e-voting systems were first developed and
adopted.
5.4.1 Standards, Analysis and Requirements Capture
Analysis is the process of maximizing problem domain understanding. Only
through complete understanding can an analyst comprehend the responsibilities
of a system. The modelling of these responsibilities is a natural way of expressing
system requirements. The simplest way for an analyst to increase understanding
is through interaction with the customer and potential users of the system, where
one of the most common problems is that an interrelated set of requirements
must be incorporated into one coherent and consistent framework. Interaction
with the customer is an example of informal communication. It is an important
part of analysis and, although it cannot be formalized, it is possible to add rigour
to the process. A well-defined analysis method can help the communication
process by reducing the amount of information an analyst needs to assimilate.
By stating the type of information that is useful, it is possible to structure the
communication process. Effective analysis for building requirements models is
dependent on knowing the sort of information that is required, extracting it,
and recording it in some coherent fashion.
Clearly, a document which proposes a set of standards for a general problem
domain has a key role to play in the analysis and requirements capture during
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the development of a particular system within that domain. The nature of
the standards dictates how they should be used in improving analysis and
requirements capture, and hence in addressing the major issues that often arise
when building any complex computer system: will the user trust it enough
to use it, will the customer be able to ensure that the system being procured
meets the needs of the users, will a delivered system be amenable to independent
verification (test) against that which was agreed during procurement, and will
the manufacturers be able to better design their product based on the shared
knowledge of the common required standards?
5.5 Restructured Requirements
We propose that the CoE standards document can be restructured as a first
step towards rooting-out the faults described above.
The committee began by classifying their standards according to the election
principles they aim to uphold: Universal, Equal, Free, Secret and Direct
Suffrage. (See section 1.6 for our definitions of these principles). They could
have taken this classification further, however, and divided all the standards
according to those categories. That is how the requirements catalogue that
follows was first developed; changes were then made as necessary (see section
5.6).
This approach has several advantages. First, the five principles have been
developed over a long period of history to capture almost all the high-level
requirements of fair elections; by structuring lower-lever requirements according
to these categories we enhance our ability to cover all requirements. Second, if
lower-level requirements are grouped together in a simple, logical and systematic
manner, we reduce the risk of inconsistency and redundancy. This conclusion
is supported by the fact that restructuring the document helped uncover
inconsistencies, redundancies and gaps in the requirements. Third, a well-
structured document is easier to understand, to maintain, and to use.
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The one requirement that we were unable to fit into any of these categories
was the need for the electorate to trust the system. An election must not only
be fair, but also seen to be fair. For this reason we added “trusted suffrage” to
the list of election principles. However, we have placed this requirement last,
since the trustworthiness of the system is more important than the trustedness.
In fact the latter is undesirable in the absence of the former.
The following sections contain our modified and restructured version of the
CoE standards. In the text below, italicized numbers in parentheses refer to
requirements in the standards document [40] (the original requirements have
been included here as appendix B). Where a requirement in the original
document was deemed to cover more than one concept, it was split (see section
5.6.1); these sub-requirements are referred to by letters (e.g. (61b)) and the
divisions are made explicit in appendix B with annotations in the requirements
themselves. Each section begins with the definition of the election principle
under consideration as per section 1.6.
5.5.1 Universal Suffrage
All human beings have the right to ·cast· a ·vote· subject to
certain conditions, for example age and nationality.
Under this category we will include requirements that the system be universally
available and universally usable.
1) The ·e-voting system· shall be universally available, that is: every ·eligible
voter· shall have access to at least one ·voting channel·. (4)
1. A contingency procedure shall be drawn up to prepare for the possibility
that one or more ·voting channels· become unavailable, and to provide
alternative ·voting channels· where necessary. (61b, 70a, 71a)
2. The contingency procedure shall include measures for physical disaster
recovery. (75b)
3. Staff shall be trained to follow the contingency procedure. (71b)
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4. The ·e-voting system· shall be protected against threats to its availability
including: malfunction, breakdown and denial of service attacks. (30)
5. The availability of each ·voting channel· shall be subject to regular
checks. (79b)
6. The timetable for ·voting channel· availability shall be designed to
maximize ·voter· access and shall be made public well in advance of
the start of the ·polling period·. (37, 45)
2) User interface design (for all interfaces, including ·vote-casting interface·,
registration (2) and administration) shall follow best practice to maximize
usability (1b, 61a, 65), in particular:
1. Interfaces shall be understandable. It shall be made clear to ·voters·
whether they are participating in a genuine ·election·, and whether their
·vote· has been recorded correctly. (1a, 14, 50)
2. Voters shall be consulted during the design and testing of ·vote-casting
interface· and registration interfaces. (62)
3. The needs of ·voters· with disabilities shall be taken into account in the
design of the interface. Appropriate advocacy groups shall be consulted,
and compatibility with relevant products and compliance with relevant
standards maximized, to that end. (3, 63, 64)
3) Voters shall be educated in the use of the ·vote-casting interface· and
regarding any steps required in order to participate. (38)
1. Voters shall be given the opportunity to practise using the interface.
(22)
2. Support and guidance shall be available to ·voters· through widely
available communication channels. (46)
3. Where there may be doubt (such as with remote voting) ·voters· shall be
educated as to how they may confirm that they are using an authentic
·voting channel· and that the authentic ·ballot· has been presented. (90b)
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5.5.2 Equal Suffrage
Each ·eligible voter· has the same number of ·votes·.
This category includes measures that prevent fraudulent or erroneous ·votes·
from being recorded.
4) Only ·votes· ·cast· by ·eligible voters· shall be counted, and only the permitted
number of ·votes· for that ·voter·. (5a, 94) Note: this will require special
attention where ·voters· are allowed to ·cast· provisional ·votes·.
5) An authentication system shall exist to distinguish ·eligible voters· from
others, and those who have successfully ·cast· ·votes· from those who have not.
Note: this may require special attention where multiple ·voting channels· exist,
and where ·voters’ registers· may not be up-to-date. (5b, 6, 41, 44, 82)
6) Votes shall not be recorded outside the ·polling period·. However, provision
shall be made for latency in ·voting channels·. (91, 96)
5.5.3 Free Suffrage
The ·voter· has the right to form and to express his opinion in
a free manner, without any coercion or undue influence.
7) The free formation and expression of the ·voter’s· opinion shall be secured,
as – where required – shall the personal exercise of the right to ·vote·. (9)
8) The ·vote-casting interface· shall be free from any information, other than
that strictly required for ·casting· the ·vote·. The ·e-voting system· shall prevent2
the display of other messages that may influence the ·voters’· choice. (48)
9) The ·e-voting system· shall not permit any manipulative influence to be
exercised over the ·voter· during ·vote·-·casting·. (12)
10) Information on ·voters’· options shall be presented with equality and shall
2Italics are used here to highlight the change from ‘avoid’ to ‘prevent’.
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be widely available. (43, 47, 49)
11) Voters shall not have access to information which may prejudice their
decision, such as the number of ·votes· already ·cast· for a particular option.
(53)
12) Voters shall be free to participate without expressing a preference, for
example by ·casting· a blank ·vote·. (13)
5.5.4 Secret Suffrage
The ·voter· has the right, and the duty, to ·cast· his ·vote·
secretly as an individual, and the state has the duty to protect
that right.
Secret suffrage, or ·voter· anonymity, is not always implemented the same way.
In the Republic of Ireland, for instance, ·voter· anonymity is absolute. Any
marks on the ·ballot· paper which identify the ·voter· invalidates the vote. In
the United Kingdom, on the other hand, ·voter· anonymity is conditional. The
identity of ·voters· can be discovered using the unique codes on ·ballot· papers;
this information is considered a state secret. The decision between absolute and
conditional anonymity was not made explicit in the original CoE document, and
this led to inconsistency between requirements [112].
13) The ·e-voting system· shall, to the extent allowed by law, protect the secrecy
of the ·vote·. Note that this may be endangered by processing ·votes· in small
groups.(18, 54)
1. Where the law requires absolute anonymity, it shall be impossible to
reproduce the link between ·voter· and ·vote·. Where the law requires
conditional anonymity, it shall be impossible to reproduce such a link
without the permission of the relevant authority. (contrast with 17)
2. At no stage shall the ·voter’s· identity and ·vote· be available together in
unencrypted form to any person (other than the ·voter·) or system (16,
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19, 34b, 35, 93a, 106), except where required by law and sanctioned by
the relevant authority.
3. The ·voter· shall not be allowed to retain possession of anything which
could be used as proof to another person of the ·vote· ·cast·. (51, 52)
4. Voters shall be able to alter their choice at any point in the ·voting
process· before ·casting· their ·vote·, or to break off the procedure,
without their previous choices being recorded or made available to any
other person. (11)
5. The ·e-voting system· shall maintain the privacy of individuals. Con-
fidentiality of ·voters’ registers· stored in or communicated by the ·e-
voting system· shall be maintained. (78)
6. The ·audit system· shall not endanger the secrecy of the ·vote· (contrast
with 103a).
5.5.5 Direct Suffrage
The results of the ·poll· shall be determined by the ·votes· ·cast·
by the ·voters·.
The committee did not categorize any of their standards under “direct suffrage”
saying that it “does not call for special attention” [40, page 26]. We contend
that, since direct suffrage (as defined by the CoE) requires that “the ballots
cast by the voters directly determine the person(s) elected” [40, page 25], any
measure used to protect the ·votes· from tampering falls into this category, as
does any measure to ensure that the results are tabulated correctly.
14) The ·e-voting system· shall accurately record ·votes·. (95)
1. It shall be ensured that the ·voter· is presented with an authentic ·ballot·.
(90a)
2. The ·vote· ·cast· by a ·voter· shall be the ·vote· recorded within the
system. (92) [83, guideline 42]
15) The ·e-voting system· shall prevent recorded ·votes· from being changed or
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deleted. (15, 34a, 92)
16) The ·e-voting system· shall accurately calculate the result based solely on
the ·votes· ·cast·. (7, 98)
1. There shall be a secure and reliable method to aggregate all ·votes·. (8)
In order to support these requirements:
17) Provision shall be made for the observation of all stages of ·elections· to the
extent permitted by law. (23, 56)
1. Reliable, accurate, detailed observation data shall be produced. (83)
2. Observers shall be educated about the expected behaviour of the system
and its operators so that they can make informed judgements about the
reliability of ·election· results [112]
18) There shall be a comprehensive ·audit system· designed into the e-voting
system to provide information about the functioning of the system at all levels.
(59, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 107, 108) Audit information recorded shall, at a
minimum, include:
1. the number of ·votes· ·cast·
2. count information (including personnel involved, and enough informa-
tion to reproduce the count results)
3. any suspicious activities which may indicate some kind of attack on the
system (including ·votes· affected, if applicable)
4. system failures and malfunctions
5. logs of authorized access to the system (including ·user· identity and
activities undertaken). (57, 58)
19) Software engineering best practice shall be followed, including:
1. A comprehensive risk assessment shall underpin the decision to intro-
duce e-voting in general, and any system in particular. This assessment
shall be carried out by individuals with a suitable level of expertise.
(III) 3
3The very important requirement for a full risk assessment is not included as a standard by
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2. Components’ access to time sources shall be strictly limited on a “need
to know” basis [112, 30]. (contrast with 84, see section 5.6.4)
3. Change management for the system shall be open and transparent. In
particular:
(a) All components of the system shall be subject to version control.
(69b)
(b) It shall be possible to accurately and reliably determine whether a
given component is the version tested and approved for use.
(c) Any updates of software, including third-party software such as
operating systems, shall be justified before installation [112].
(d) There shall be a bug-tracking system.
(e) All of these measures shall follow best practices.
4. Compliance with suitable open standards is recommended. (66)
5. At least one competent, independent body (·certification authority·)
shall be appointed to assess and certify the system’s operation and
compliance with these standards. (111)
6. The ·certification authority· shall develop a test plan which covers
testing to be carried out: before the system is introduced, at regular
intervals, and triggered by specific events (for example software updates,
upcoming ·elections·) as well as the timing of such tests. (25, 31, 73)
7. All components of the system and software used, and all audit in-
formation, shall be publicly disclosed. Exceptions to this rule shall
only be allowed where it can be shown that such a disclosure would
either endanger the security of the system or genuinely endanger the
intellectual property of the vendor. In either of these cases, full
disclosure shall be made to the ·certification authority· for verification
and certification purposes. (contrast with 24, 69a, 105, 110)
8. The system shall be fault tolerant and fail safe.
(a) Any backup system shall conform to the same standards and
the committee, but is mentioned in the introduction to Appendix III of the CoE document.
See footnote on page 156.
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requirements as the original system. (70b)
(b) Technical and organizational measures shall be taken to ensure that
no data will be permanently lost in the event of a breakdown or a
fault affecting the ·e-voting system·. (27 – see point 65 in [40, page
37] , 77)
20) Security measures shall be employed (28) to protect the system from fraud
and error. (29)
1. Where data must be transmitted and/or stored electronically its origin
shall be verifiable and its integrity shall be protected. Currently this
is likely to require the use of cryptography. (26, 75c, 89, 97, 99, 109)
(Such data may include ·votes·, ·voters’ registers·, lists of candidates
(86), and audit information.)
2. Where access to data must be restricted (for example authentication
data), its secrecy shall be protected. Currently this is likely to require
the use of cryptography. (81)
3. The system shall be monitored during operation for compliance with
requirements. (72a, 79a)
4. Security arrangements shall ensure that, for the duration of operation,
each component is the version tested and approved for use.
5. Incident levels shall be defined and appropriate responses identified.
(76)
6. All technical operations shall be subject to a formal control procedure.
(74a) In particular:
(a) The principle of separation of duty shall be applied wherever
applicable. [113]
(b) Physical and electronic access to equipment used in ·elections· shall
be limited via a comprehensive authentication system which com-
plies with best practice, including the principle of least privilege.
(32a, 80)
(c) Clear rules shall be developed for determining access privileges
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of individuals, and for the appointment of personnel to sensitive
positions. (32a)
(d) All personnel who have been assigned a cryptographic key for
authentication shall be educated about key management.
(e) The physical security of equipment used in ·elections· shall be
protected during (75a) and between ·elections·. Access shall be
restricted according to the formal control procedure.
(f) Any changes to key equipment shall be notified to the authorities
identified in the control procedure. (74b)
(g) Critical technical activities shall be carried out by teams of at
least two people. The composition of the teams shall be regularly
changed. All such activities shall be the subject of a report. As
far as possible, such activities shall be carried out outside ·election
periods·. (32b, 33a)
(h) Where such activities must be undertaken during an ·election
period·, they shall be monitored by ·election· observers. (33b)
5.5.6 Trusted Suffrage
The ·eligible voters· must trust that these principles have been
upheld.
The results of a ·poll· produce no mandate if the ·electors· don’t trust them.
Therefore, if for no other reason, ·voter· trust is vital.
21) Steps shall be taken to maximize ·voter· confidence in the system (20)
including:
1. Voters shall be educated about how the system works, and the measures
taken to protect its integrity (21).
94
CHAPTER 5. REQUIREMENTS FOR E-VOTING: TOP-DOWN
5.6 Analysis of Restructuring
Rather than giving a detailed discussion of all decisions made during the
restructuring process the following sections highlight certain categories of
decision, giving examples of each. Due to the faults discussed in section 5.3, we
found it necessary to split, merge, rephrase, contradict and leave out standards
from the original document, as well as add standards that should have been
included but were not. In the following we cite examples of each type of change;
the last section is the most comprehensive, referencing (though not quoting) all
standards left out completely.
For the sake of clarity, we will continue to refer to standards in the original
CoE document using parenthesized numbers in italics (e.g. (39)). We will refer
to standards in our restructured set using numbers in bold (e.g. 19.3d).
5.6.1 Split
There were multiple cases where a single standard actually covered several
concepts. For example:
(69) “The competent electoral authorities shall publish an
official list of the software used in an e-election or e-referendum.
Member states may exclude from this list data protection
software for security reasons. At the very least it shall indicate
the software used, the versions, its date of installation and a
brief description. A procedure shall be established for regularly
installing updated versions and corrections of the relevant
protection software. It shall be possible to check the state of
protection of the voting equipment at any time.” [40, page 16]
Its length alone is an indication that it covers more than one concept. Such
standards were broken up for consideration in the restructuring process, and
sub-standards referred to using letters. The example above was split into (69a)
(“The competent . . . description.”) and (69b) (“A procedure . . . any time”).
In many cases, these sub-standards were then merged with other standards,
rephrased, contradicted or left out. See below.
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5.6.2 Merged
Because the document did not have a single over-arching structure, many
concepts were dealt with in a somewhat piecemeal fashion. Different aspects
of the same concept appeared in various parts of the document. Grouping these
aspects together should help prevent inconsistencies.
In our restructured set we included:
5 “An authentication system shall exist to distinguish ·eligible
voters· from others, and those who have successfully ·cast· ·votes·
from those who have not. Note: this may require special
attention where multiple ·voting channels· exist, and where
·voters’ registers· may not be up-to-date.”
This incorporates the following five standards from the original document:
(5b) “A voter shall be authorised to vote only if it has been
established that his/her ballot has not yet been inserted into
the ballot box.” [40, page 9]
(6) “The e-voting system shall prevent any voter from casting a
vote by more than one voting channel.” [40, page 9]
(41) “In cases where there is an overlap between the period
for voter registration and the voting period, provision for
appropriate voter authentication shall be made.” [40, page 13]
(44) “It is particularly important, where remote e-voting takes
place while polling stations are open, that the system shall be
so designed that it prevents any voter from voting more than
once.” [40, page 13]
(82) “Identification of voters and candidates in a way that they
can unmistakably be distinguished from other persons (unique
identification) shall be ensured.” [40, page 17]
5.6.3 Rephrased
Many of the standards were rephrased, for diverse reasons. This example
is overly verbose and refers to “[t]he level of incident” which is not defined
anywhere else in the document.
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(76) “Where incidents that could threaten the integrity of the
system occur, those responsible for operating the equipment
shall immediately inform the competent electoral authorities,
who will take the necessary steps to mitigate the effects of the
incident. The level of incident which shall be reported shall be
specified in advance by the electoral authorities.” [40, page 17]
We rephrased it as follows:
20.5 “Incident levels shall be defined and appropriate responses
identified.”
5.6.4 Contradicted
There were certain of the original standards deemed to be just plain wrong. For
example:
(84) “The e-voting system shall maintain reliable synchronised
time sources. The accuracy of the time source shall be sufficient
to maintain time marks for audit trails and observations data,
as well as for maintaining the time limits for registration,
nomination, voting, or counting.” [40, page 18]
As Jones [112] and Mercuri [30] have discussed elsewhere, access to clocks can
be a source of security risk (for instance, they might be used to trigger a Trojan
Horse, or may endanger voter anonymity). Therefore (84) is contradicted in our
standards:
19.2 “Components’ access to time sources shall be strictly
limited on a ‘need to know’ basis.”
5.6.5 Added
Several standards which should have been included were not. Two examples of
standards we had to add are:
19.3d “There shall be a bug-tracking system.”
20.4 “Security arrangements shall ensure that, for the duration
of operation, each component is the version tested and approved
for use.”
97
CHAPTER 5. REQUIREMENTS FOR E-VOTING: TOP-DOWN
5.6.6 Not Included
(10, 36, 39, 40, 42, 55, 60, 67, 68, 72b, 85, 87, 88, 93b, 112) were not included
in the restructured requirements for the following reasons.
(36, 39, 60, 87, 88 and 112) were deemed to be outside the scope of the
document. For example:
(36) “Domestic legal provisions governing an e-election or e-
referendum shall provide for clear timetables concerning all
stages of the election or referendum, both before and after the
election or referendum.” [40, page 12]
This is not directly related to the design or use of e-voting systems. It would
neither help a manufacturer to develop a better system, nor help a government
determine whether a given system was ‘good’ or ‘bad’.
(10) is “paternalistic” [112]. There is no reason why interface designers
should attempt to ensure deliberation on the part of the voter, and attempts to
do so would likely only make the interface annoying. The traditional paper ballot
does not have any measures to “. . . prevent [the voters’] voting precipitately or
without reflection”.
The registration of candidates and voters online (40, 42) is extremely
inadvisable at this time. The difficulties associated with effective authentication
on the Internet are well known [9, 114].
The reason for the inclusion of
(55) “Any decoding required for the counting of the votes shall
be carried out as soon as practicable after the closure of the
voting period” [40, page 14]
is unclear, particularly in light of the presence of
(34) “The e-voting system shall ... keep [the votes] sealed until
the counting process.” [40, page 12]
(67 and 68) refer specifically to the use of EML. While the use of open
standards can be advantageous (see point 120 in [40, page 48]) it is not advisable
to support a particular standard in a requirements document beyond citing it
as an example.
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(72b) “The backup services shall be regularly supplied with monitoring
protocols”
is indecipherable.
The assignment of responsibility for compliance with standards is complex,
and
(85) “Electoral authorities have overall responsibility for com-
pliance with these security requirements, which shall be assessed
by independent bodies” [40, page 18]
risks reducing the responsibility of vendors of e-voting systems.
Since voter anonymity is a responsibility as well as a right, we should never
rely on the voter to delete evidence of their ·vote· (93b).
5.7 Evaluation
As the above analysis has shown, the CoE standards document is flawed.
The inconsistency, incompleteness, over- and under-specification, redundancy
and repetition that have been demonstrated could lead to ‘bad’ systems being
certified against these requirements, and/or ‘good’ systems failing. These flaws
were identified using standard software engineering practices, and their presence
indicates inadequate involvement of experts in the development of the document.
The revised requirements presented in this chapter are not intended as a
replacement for the CoE standards, however they do contain improvements.
Each requirement encapsulates a single concept which reduces the risk of
contradiction and ambiguity, and makes the task of testing against the
requirements easier. The requirements are organized in a logical and consistent
manner, under the election principles defined in section 1.6. Grouping them
together like this helps to reduce the risk of repetition, redundancy and
contradiction because any clashing requirements should be close to one another
and so easier to spot. It also makes the whole document more human-readable,
and therefore more easily maintained.
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Our glossary of terms is more extensive than the one included in the CoE
document. Highlighting the use of glossary-terms typographically has made
it easier to check that they are used consistently. Requirements were added
where we discovered incompleteness (e.g. 19.3d), and removed where they were
deemed to be outside the scope of the document (e.g. (36)). Cases of over- and
under-specification (e.g. (66) and (65) respectively) were removed or rephrased.
Cases of redundancy and repetition were reduced by merging requirements (e.g.
5 summarizes (5b), (6), (41), (44) and (82)).
However, our specification also exhibits some undesirable traits. For
instance: there are still some requirements that are quite aspirational (e.g. 7);
it is not always clear where responsibility lies for ensuring compliance with a
given requirement; the specification has not been subjected to the more rigorous
checks used on the requirements presented in the next chapter. The intention
in presenting this restructured requirements catalogue is to give examples of
the kind of flaws common in requirements specifications, and to indicate one
method that might be used to reduce the number of those flaws. In the following
chapter we present a requirements catalogue developed in a bottom-up manner,
and propose that it might form the basis for a future standard.
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Requirements for E-voting:
Bottom-up
In the previous chapter we developed a set of requirements from an existing
catalogue in a top-down fashion (abstract to specific). Another approach we
could take is to develop a new set of requirements from scratch, and then
categorize those requirements according to several abstract concepts (see section
6.3). This chapter presents a catalogue of requirements developed in this
way. As with the requirements in chapter 5 this catalogue is not intended to
fulfill the role outlined in section 1.5 but rather to demonstrate one method of
development, though it might form the basis of a generally useful requirements
catalogue.
6.1 Terminology
As discussed in section 1.1, words and phrases from the glossary (appendix A)
appear ·like this· wherever we mean the glossary definition to apply. There were
other terms used in these requirements which can only be defined within a given
context, they appear underlined throughout the specification (see section 6.4.8).
The numbering of requirements is formed from a reference to the category
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in which the requirement belongs (e.g. Sec for security requirements), and a
number indicating where in the list it appears.
The key words shall and should (where they appear in small capitals) are
used as described in RFC 2119 [4], i.e.: shall means that the definition is an
absolute requirement of the specification, while should means that there may
exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore a particular item, but
the full implications must be understood and carefully weighed before choosing
a different course. In the case where a different course is chosen, all reasoning
must be made explicit.
We use a shorthand to refer to the election principles discussed in section
1.6: universal [un] , equal [eq] , free [fr] , secret [se] , direct [di] , trusted [tr]
suffrage.
6.2 Limitations of Specification
As these requirements were developed for critical elections, remote e-voting
systems are not considered (see section 1.2.3). We exclude voter-registration and
voter-authentication from our current analysis, since they are outside the scope
of this thesis; we assume that they are implemented as per paper-only elections.
Indeed, we assume that the whole system is protected by the same organizational
measures used in standard paper-only elections. Therefore requirements for such
measures are generally left out (e.g. we do not include a requirement that poll-
workers must satisfy themselves of a voter’s identity before authorizing him to
vote).
The requirements in their current form are not flexible enough to cover
non-DRE ·e-voting systems·. For example, the following requirements assume
the existence of a ·voting device· as part of the ·e-voting system·: Sec 10,
Sec 12, Sec 23, Funct 1, Funct 2, Funct 3, Funct 4, Funct 5, Funct 6, Funct 7,
Funct 9, Funct 10, Usab 4, Org 3, Org 4, Org 8, Org 11, Assur 1. Therefore
this catalogue excludes, for example, Mark-sense (also known as optical-scan)
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and digital pen election systems.
6.3 Development of Requirements
We developed the first draft of these requirements from our own experience
and understanding of e-voting systems. We then iteratively compared them
to various existing catalogues to incrementally improve the requirements (see
section 6.5).
We developed them to have a clear, consistent phraseology. Each require-
ment identifies:
 The responsible entity (such as the ·manufacturer· in Assur 2 or the
·election device· in Sec 9)
 The degree of flexibility (requirements with the keyword shall are
absolute, whereas for requirements with the keyword should exceptions
may be reasonable. Such exceptions must be explicitly justified – see
section 4.4.1)
 The action required
The majority of requirements are in the inflexible shall form. Of the
should requirements several go on to identify a minimum shall clause; that
is, where for whatever reason the should clause cannot be met, at least the
shall clause must be. This is intended to identify the core requirement, while
recognizing the need for flexibility in some circumstances. For example, Sec 13
states:
The ·election devices· should not store any data which could
link the ·voter· with his ·vote· either during normal operation
(all election phases – see figure 6.1), or in the case of exception,
malfunction or system breakdown. Where such data is stored
the ·e-voting system· shall ensure that it is only accessible to
those with appropriate authorization.
This acknowledges that in certain jurisdictions (notably the UK) the link
between a ·voter· and his ·vote· must be retained for legal reasons. In that
case, however, the information must be carefully guarded.
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We have divided our requirements (section 6.4) into the following categories:
security, functional, usability, organizational, assurance and audit system
requirements. To make the value of the requirements clear (especially to those
without technical background) each is associated with at least one election
principle (universal [un] , equal [eq] , free [fr] , secret [se] , direct [di] , trusted
[tr] suffrage – see section 1.6).
Figure 6.1: Election phases
In the process of assigning these principles to the requirements we found that
many could be said to be upholding both free and direct elections, or both equal
and direct. After all, it could be said that all the other principles exist to ensure
direct elections. We decided that the best way to clarify this was to apply the
principles of free, equal and universal elections to individual voters, and direct
to collections of votes. Figure 6.1 illustrates this difference; the election phases
in this diagram are further explained in the glossary (appendix A).
Some of the requirements are interconnected. Where we considered it useful
to the reader’s understanding of the requirements as a whole, we have made
these connections explicit; cross-references in the requirement definitions are
shown with the name of the connected requirement in braces (e.g. {Sec 13}).
Certain terms can only be defined within a given context, for example
appropriate authorization (Sec 2) or election data (Sec 17). We have called
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these ·responsible election authority· variables. They appear underlined through-
out the requirements. They must be defined by the ·responsible election
authority· before their respective requirements can be assessed. See section
6.4.8 for a list of all ·responsible election authority· variables.
6.4 Requirements
6.4.1 Security Requirements
Sec 1 [eq] [tr] The ·e-voting system· shall implement a solution to the
conflict between the need for ballot secrecy {Sec 13} and the need for accuracy
{Funct 6}.
Sec 2 [eq] The ·election devices· shall ensure that, during the ·polling period·,
·e-votes· can only be added through the ·vote-casting interface·, and only with
appropriate authorization.
Sec 3 [di] The ·election devices· shall prevent loss of ·election· data during
normal operation (all election phases – see figure 6.1), and in the case of
exception, malfunction or system breakdown.
Sec 4 [all] The ·election devices· shall implement the access control policy
defined by the ·responsible election authority· {Org 2}.
Sec 5 [all] The ·election devices· shall be capable of producing comprehensive
audit data.
Sec 6 [eq] The ·election devices· shall provide the functionality to check that
the ·e-ballot box· is empty.
Sec 7 [eq] The ·election devices· should provide the functionality to completely
delete all ·election· data from previous ·elections·.
Sec 8 [un] The ·election devices· shall be robust {Sec 3} against
1. power outage
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2. unexpected ·user· activity
3. environmental effects (mechanical, electromagnetic, climatic, etc.)
4. etc.
Sec 9 [un] The ·election devices· shall provide feedback in the form of error
messages in the case of exceptions and malfunctions.
Sec 10 [un] The ·voting device· shall prevent ·voter· interaction in the case of
unresolved exceptions and malfunctions of the ·voting device·.
Sec 11 [un] The ·e-ballot box· shall provide the functionality to determine
whether the ·e-vote· of the last ·voter· was successfully stored in the case of
exceptions, malfunctions and breakdowns.
Sec 12 [se] When a ·voter· completes the ·voting process· (by ·casting· his ·vote·
or cancelling) the ·voting device· shall delete any record of his ·selections· from
display.
Sec 13 [se] The ·election devices· should not store any data which could link
the ·voter· with his ·vote· either during normal operation (all election phases –
see figure 6.1), or in the case of exception, malfunction or system breakdown.
Where such data is stored the ·e-voting system· shall ensure that it is only
accessible to those with appropriate authorization.
Sec 14 [se] The ·e-ballot box· shall store the ·votes· in a history independent
way. The ·e-ballot box· shall prevent determination of ·casting· order, and
shall not store any timestamp with the ·e-vote·.
Sec 15 [se] [eq] [tr] Components of the ·e-voting system· (other than the ·audit
system·) should not have access to any time source.
Sec 16 [se] [fr] The ·e-voting system· shall prevent the calculation of results
during the ·polling period·.
Sec 17 [di] The ·e-voting system· shall protect the integrity and authenticity
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of ·election· data {Sec 24}.
Sec 18 [all] The ·election devices· shall be tamper-resistant and tamper-
evident.
Sec 19 [all] The ·e-voting system· shall provide the functionality to accurately
and reliably determine whether a given component (hardware or software) is the
version evaluated and approved for use.
Sec 20 [di] The ·e-ballot box· shall be tamper-resistant and tamper-evident.
Sec 21 [se] Where more than one ·poll· is run in parallel, the ·e-voting system·
shall prevent anyone from linking the ·e-votes· of a particular ·voter· to one
another.
Sec 22 [di] The ·counting software· shall accurately calculate results using the
appropriate algorithm based on all ·e-votes· ·cast· during the ·polling period· and
only such ·e-votes·.
Sec 23 [di] The ·counting software· should run isolated from the ·voting
device·.
Sec 24 [di] The ·counting software· shall verify the integrity and authenticity
of ·votes· {Sec 17}.
Sec 25 [di] The ·counting software’s· operations and data shall be unaffected
by other applications.
6.4.2 Functional Requirements
Funct 1 [se] The ·voting device· shall not display any information about the
·voter’s· ·selections· outside the ·vote-casting interface·.
Funct 2 [se] The ·voting device· shall prevent any emissions which might
endanger the secrecy of the ·vote·.
Funct 3 [fr] The ·voting device· shall ensure equality of presentation of ·ballot·
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options.
Funct 4 [di] The ·voting device· shall indicate to the ·poll-worker· the number
of ·votes· ·cast· so far.
Funct 5 [eq] The ·poll-worker interface· shall indicate to the ·poll-worker·
whether the ·voting device· is in an ·active state· or an ·inactive state·.
Funct 6 [fr] [eq] The ·voting device· shall ensure that the ·voter’s· ·selections·
are accurately represented in the ·e-vote·.
Funct 7 [fr] The ·voting device· shall accurately display the authentic ·ballot·.
Funct 8 [tr] The ·e-voting system· shall not obstruct the use of alternative
·counting software· to calculate results.
Funct 9 [un] The ·voting device· shall be capable of recording an adequate
number of ·votes·.
Funct 10 [fr] The ·voting device· shall support an adequate number of ·ballot·
options.
Funct 11 [un] All ·election devices· should be compatible with other devices
(such as those used by people with disabilities) where appropriate.
Funct 12 [fr] The ·vote-casting interface· should provide the functionality for
the ·voter· to:
1. change his ·selection(s)· before ·casting·
2. ·spoil· his ·vote·
3. cancel his ·voting process·
4. clear all his ·selections·.
Funct 13 [fr] The ·vote-casting interface· should warn the ·voter· when he is
about to ·spoil· his ·vote· in one or more ·polls· {Funct 12}.
Funct 14 [all] The ·poll-worker interface· shall provide the functionality to
check that the ·election devices· have been set up, and are functioning, correctly.
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6.4.3 Usability Requirements
Usab 1 [un] The ·manufacturer· shall ensure that all ·user· interfaces on all
·election devices· are user-friendly.
Usab 2 [un] The ·manufacturer· shall ensure that all system messages
provided by all interfaces are understandable.
Usab 3 [un] The ·vote-casting interface· shall make provision for ·voters· with
disabilities.
Usab 4 [fr] [un] The ·vote-casting interface· shall clearly indicate to the ·voter·
whether the ·voting device· is in an ·active state· or an ·inactive state·.
Usab 5 [tr] The ·vote-casting interface· shall provide immediate feedback to
the ·voter· regarding the status of his ·vote· (for example, that his ·vote· has
been stored successfully in the ·e-ballot box·).
Usab 6 [fr] The ·vote-casting interface· should protect the ·voter· from
accidentally ·casting· his ·vote·.
Usab 7 [all] All ·poll-worker interfaces· shall protect ·poll-workers· from
taking any action accidentally.
6.4.4 Organizational Requirements
Org 1 [tr] The ·responsible election authority· shall define all ·responsible
election authority· variables (listed in section 6.4.8), prescribe the certifica-
tion process (including decertification and recertification), and appoint the
·independent testing authority·.
Org 2 [tr] The ·responsible election authority· shall define (for all election
phases - see figure 6.1):
1. ·user· roles
2. an access control policy that restricts all activities to particular ·user·-
roles (taking account of the principle of separation of duties)
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3. necessary administration activities
4. a cryptographic key management policy
5. incident levels
6. reporting procedures
7. provisions for election observation
8. etc.
Org 3 [tr] The ·responsible election authority· shall develop procedures
covering all stages of the ·election· including:
1. secure storage of ·election devices· at all times
2. system maintenance including software updates (from the ·manufacturer·
or from third party suppliers)
3. logistics (transport of ·election devices·, spare ·election devices·, acces-
sories, etc.)
4. configuration of all ·election devices· (including ·ballot· details and order
on ·voting devices· and ·counting software·)
5. checking ·election devices· (including their configuration and that the
·e-ballot box· is empty)
6. response to ·election device· breakdown (including level of access allowed
to representatives of the ·manufacturer·)
7. recording of ·poll-worker· activities, ·manufacturer· representatives’
activities, ·voting device· state changes, system restarts, etc.
8. ensuring that any transferable-proof of the ·vote· (that is, proof which
can be used to show other people how he ·voted·) provided to the ·voter·,
is deposited in the ·ballot box·
9. ensuring that, during an ·election·, ·voting devices· are only ever in an
·active state· during the ·polling period·
10. closing the ·poll(s)· including disabling ·voting devices·
11. counting and recounting
12. comparing number of ·votes· recorded with number of ·electors· {Org 4}
13. ·archiving period· including data deletion at the end {Sec 7}
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14. examining audit data, and checking for evidence of tampering {Sec 18,
Sec 20, Audit 5}
15. redundant storage of data
16. system breakdown
17. etc.
Org 4 [tr] The ·responsible election authority· shall develop a contingency plan
describing appropriate responses to the following circumstances:
1. results produced by recount or alternative ·counting software· do not
agree with original result
2. number of ·votes· recorded does not match number of ·electors·
3. ·voter· leaves a ·voting device· in an ·active state·
4. etc.
Org 5 [tr] Before the ·election· the ·responsible election authority· should
publicly disclose all technical information about the ·election devices· (including
design, configuration, version numbers for all software, etc.). The ·responsible
election authority· shall provide a detailed justification for every document not
so disclosed.
Org 6 [di] The ·responsible election authority· shall ensure that ·election· data
is stored, and its integrity and authenticity preserved {Sec 17, Audit 6}, for the
prescribed ·archiving period·.
Org 7 [tr] The ·responsible election authority· should procure alternative
·counting software· to check results {Org 4}.
Org 8 [fr] [tr] The ·responsible election authority· shall educate ·voters· in the
use of the ·voting devices· and shall ensure that the information provided to
them is understandable {Assur 5}, providing translations where appropriate.
Org 9 [un] The ·responsible election authority· shall educate ·poll-workers· in
the use of the ·election devices· and about the procedures they must follow and
shall ensure that information provided to them is understandable {Assur 5,
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Org 10, Assur 5, Org 3}.
Org 10 [all] The ·poll-workers· shall follow the procedures described by the
·responsible election authority· {Org 3} and shall respond to system messages
in accordance with the user-guide {Assur 5, Org 9}.
Org 11 [un] The ·responsible election authority· shall ensure that adequate
spare ·voting devices· are available.
6.4.5 Assurance Requirements
Assur 1 [eq] The only interfaces to the ·voting device· should be the ·vote-
casting interface· (including those designed for ·voters· with disabilities) and
·poll-worker interfaces·. Where other interfaces exist they shall be disabled.
Assur 2 [tr] The ·manufacturer· shall develop the ·election devices· according
to software engineering best practice, including use of version control and bug
tracking for all documents and source code.
Assur 3 [un] The ·manufacturer· shall build the ·e-voting system· from reliable
components.
Assur 4 [eq] [tr] [di] The ·manufacturer· shall limit the functionality of the
·election devices· to that necessary for ·elections·.
Assur 5 [tr] The ·manufacturer· shall produce the following documents
ensuring that they are exhaustive, consistent, unambiguous, appropriate,
comprehensible and concise
1. system specification including at least:
(a) high-level design system architecture
(b) functional specification
(c) engineering specification
2. requirement conformance claim
3. component list
4. environmental assumptions
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5. testing record
6. development security measures
7. user-guide - containing
(a) normal use instructions for all ·users· for all phases (including:
maintenance instructions, system and functional checks, system
setup, election preparation, system configuration, storage, trans-
port, sealing)
(b) appropriate responses to all system messages {Sec 9}
8. bug tracking record
9. version control record
10. etc.
Assur 6 [tr] The ·manufacturer· should publicly disclose all: documentation
listed in Assur 5, executable programs and source code. The ·manufacturer·
shall disclose these data to the ·independent testing authority·.
Assur 7 [tr] [un] The ·manufacturer· shall test the ·election devices·, these
tests shall include unit, integration, end-to-end functionality and usability
tests.
Assur 8 [un] The ·manufacturer· should involve ·users· in the interface
development process {Usab 1}.
Assur 9 [tr] The ·independent testing authority· shall do a risk analysis and
develop a threat model.
Assur 10 [all] The ·independent testing authority· shall evaluate the ·election
devices· against the requirements (including national and international legisla-
tion). Tests shall include penetration, usability and end-to-end functionality
tests.
Assur 11 [all] The ·independent testing authority· shall examine documen-
tation provided by the ·manufacturer· (including source code and details of
version control and bug tracking) for compliance with requirements and software
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engineering best practice {Assur 5, Assur 2}.
Assur 12 [all] The ·independent testing authority· shall examine the delivery
procedures for the ·election devices· and the identified development security
measures (including their application) {Assur 5}.
6.4.6 Audit System Requirements
Audit 1 [tr] The ·audit system· shall record system configuration (including
software version numbers) and ·election· configuration (including ·ballot· op-
tions) on all ·election devices· at least at the following points:
1. end of ·election setup·
2. beginning and end of ·polling period·
3. before and after counting.
Audit 2 [tr] For every action performed by ·poll-workers· the ·audit system·
should record a timestamp, the nature of the action, and ·poll-worker·
authentication data.
Audit 3 [tr] The ·audit system· shall record (with timestamps, where
appropriate) all system breakdowns, exceptions, malfunctions and results of
any self-checks.
Audit 4 [tr] The ·audit system· shall implement the access control policy
defined by the ·responsible election authority· {Org 2}.
Audit 5 [tr] The ·audit system· and its records shall be tamper-resistant and
tamper-evident.
Audit 6 [tr] The ·audit system· shall protect the integrity and authenticity of
audit records.
Audit 7 [tr] The ·audit system· should have access to a reliable time source.
Audit 8 [tr] The ·audit system· shall not record any information which might
endanger the secrecy of the ·vote·.
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6.4.7 VVAT Requirements
Where a Voter Verified Audit Trail is implemented:
VVAT 1 [tr] [eq] The VVAT shall comprise tangible, human-readable ballots
verified by individual ·voters·.
VVAT 2 [tr] [di] The ·responsible election authority· shall ensure that VVAT-
ballots are protected with adequate safeguards (including chain of custody).
VVAT 3 [tr] [se] The VVAT shall not retain ballot-casting order.
VVAT 4 [tr] [di] Where results of a ·poll· are close, the ·responsible election
authority· shall tally the VVAT-results.
VVAT 5 [tr] [di] The ·responsible election authority· shall tally the VVAT-
results in a statistically significant number of randomly selected constituencies at
every election. The ·responsible election authority· shall calculate the number
of constituencies to be checked according to established statistical principles
before the election, and shall make the random selection after the end of the
·polling period·.
VVAT 6 [tr] [eq] For the purposes of VVAT 4 and VVAT 5, VVAT-results
shall be tallied by hand.
VVAT 7 [tr] [di] Where inconsistencies are detected between the results
produced by the ·e-voting system· and the VVAT-results, the ·responsible
election authority· shall give precedence to the VVAT-results.
VVAT 8 [all] The ·responsible election authority· shall develop procedures to
handle
1. voter complaints (in DRE+VVAT systems)
2. discrepancies between results produced by the ·e-voting system· and
VVAT-results (including rules governing how many constituencies must
have their VVAT-results tallied when such discrepancies arise, and how
they are to be chosen)
115
CHAPTER 6. REQUIREMENTS FOR E-VOTING: BOTTOM-UP
3. etc.
6.4.8 Responsible Election Authority Variables
The following table lists the ·responsible election authority· variables used in
the above specification. These terms require further definition based on the
particular context in which the system is to be used.
Table 6.1: REAvars
Variable Note
appropriate authorization
Sec 2 Sec 13
Requires definition of both who can access the
data/functionality in question, and how their
identity will be checked.
·election· data
Sec 3 Sec 7 Sec 17 Org 6
This term covers at least: ·votes·, results and
audit data, but may include other data in
some contexts.
comprehensive
Sec 5
This term must be defined within the context
of both the electoral setting, and system
design.
etc.
Sec 8 Org 2 Org 3 Org 4 Org 5
Assur 5 VVAT 8
This term is used where a representative list
is included. Other elements may be added
to the list depending, for instance, on what
technology is used in the e-voting system.
adequate/adequate number
Funct 9 Funct 10 Org 11
Dependant on electoral context: number of
voters expected in an average constituency,
number of constituencies, and so on.
user-friendly
Usab 1
This term must be defined for specific users
in the context of their familiarity with given
interfaces and technology as well as other
sociological factors.
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reliable components
Assur 3
The definition of this term must take into
account international standards for reliability
in electronic components (such as resistance
to extremes of temperature).
requirements
Assur 10 Assur 11
The requirements that a given e-voting
system is subject to must be determined by
the ·responsible election authority· and the
applicable laws.
close
VVAT 4
The definition of this term will depend on the
electoral system in use. It should be based on
sound mathematical/statistical argument.
6.5 Evaluation
The limitations of this specification were discussed in section 6.2 and future
work that might be valuable is described in section 8.3. The requirements do
offer some improvements over the other catalogues we examined, however.
Our requirements bring together all of the concepts covered by those other
catalogues that are relevant to our scope (as discussed in section 6.2). Those
concepts we did not include were given one of the following labels: “as per
paper-only elections”; “not applicable to the systems under consideration”;
“over specification in this context”; “outside the scope of these requirements”.
We introduced requirements covering important concepts that are not included
in any of those other catalogues. We identified the election principle(s) that
each requirement exists to uphold, which should make the specification more
comprehensible. We also identified the evaluation technique(s) (as described
in section 4.4.1) applicable to each requirement. Concepts which are necessary
for the requirements but can only be properly defined within a given context
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are explicitly identified, and associated with explanatory notes (see section
6.4.8); this increases the flexibility of the specification without causing under-
specification. See the tables in appendix C for comparisons between our
requirements and other catalogues, as well as a summary table for our catalogue.
The tools we used to increase the quality of our requirements included
the following four techniques. Repeated validation cycles, where our current
draft was iteratively checked against other catalogues, produced a catalogue
covering all the relevant concepts. Developing the tables in appendix C
made the relationships between the catalogues explicit, showing where concepts
are included in our catalogue and reasons for leaving out requirements (this
process also uncovered oversights from the validation cycles). Developing
the summary table C.6 made explicit the principles being upheld, which
requirements introduce new concepts, appropriate evaluation techniques and
which requirements contain ·responsible election authority· variables. We
produced an interaction matrix [43] which involved the comparison of each
of our requirements with every other for conflicts and dependencies. Again,
this was an iterative process; conflicts between requirements were identified,
requirements were changed, and checks were repeated. The final interaction
matrix has not been included (except as cross-references between requirements
– see section 6.3) because the information is difficult to display and much less
useful than the process of developing the matrix.
Other requirements engineering techniques which might prove useful in the
future, but which were not used in the development of this catalogue, include:
risk driven specification [115], data-flow modelling [43] within specific electoral
contexts, and formal methods [115].
Risk driven specification requires a detailed risk-assessment which, while
called for by our requirements (Assur 9), we did not develop for this thesis;
many relevant risks may also be context specific. Data-flow modelling would
require context-specific information, in particular details about the electoral
system in use. Formal methods can produce very high-quality specifications, but
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they require expertise and a significant investment of time and other resources.
They should also be based on a quality natural language specification. These
factors combine to make formal methods beyond the scope of this thesis.
A comparison between the quality of the requirements in the previous
chapter and that of the requirements in this chapter would not be particularly
useful in determining the relative value of the two approaches taken. The
requirements in chapter 5 were written first, with the aim of highlighting some of
the problems in the CoE’s standards document and suggesting improvements.
They have not been modified in light of the work contained in this chapter.
The requirements in this chapter, on the other hand, did benefit from that
previous work. This set of requirements has also been written in a more
standardized form (see section 6.3) and has benefited from the influence of
multiple existing catalogues (whereas the previous set were only influenced by
the CoE standards).
As already stated, the requirements presented here are not a “finished
product”. An international standard for e-voting should be technology
independent (some of the above requirements are currently only applicable
to DRE systems), it should discuss evaluation and maintenance (see section
4.4) and it should cover the introduction of technology to other parts of the
democratic process (such as ·voter· registration and authentication).
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Contributions
This thesis makes several contributions to the field of e-voting. The most
important is the requirements catalogue in chapter 6 1. The requirements have
several noteworthy attributes:
 they are written to be unambiguous, using an extensive glossary of
election terminology;
 each requirement encapsulates a single concept (as opposed to several
closely related concepts);
 all of the requirements follow the same format which shows who/what
is responsible for ensuring that a requirement is met, and what it is that
they must ensure;
 the use of shall/should (as defined in section 1.1) indicates the
difference between requirements that must be met in all circumstances
and those that may be set aside provided that adequate justification has
been provided;
 they were developed to be useful in a technical context, for the develop-
ment, procurement, testing and maintenance of e-voting systems. With
respect to testability, each is associated with a testing methodology (as
described in section 4.4.1, see table C.6);
1These requirements were developed from a set of requirements produced in collaboration
with Melanie Volkamer and published in [42].
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 despite their technical focus, they are easy to read;
 the catalogue has been carefully reviewed several times to check for
internal consistency. This process was aided by the consistent use
of terminology, consistent formulation of the requirements and the
development of an interaction matrix;
 the requirements were repeatedly compared to existing catalogues to
ensure that all relevant concepts captured by those other catalogues
were covered by the new requirements (this comparison is summarized
in appendix C).
These requirements do not constitute a definitive catalogue of requirements
for e-voting, since such a catalogue would require the input and buy-in of
stakeholders from many different disciplines. However, they could form the
basis of a definitive catalogue (see section 8.3).
There are also several more minor contributions made by this thesis:
 the glossary mentioned above (appendix A) is necessary because election
terminology is particularly vulnerable to ambiguity (see section 1.1).
The terms defined cover general election terminology, election phases,
actors/entities, and devices/components. These terms were originally
selected to cover the concepts needed for requirements definitions, but
also proved useful throughout the text of the thesis;
 the description of cryptographic voting schemes (section 3.4) provides
an introduction to the area for readers with little or no familiarity with
cryptography in general, whereas most descriptions tend to assume a
certain amount of knowledge of that field on the part of the reader;
 the examination of the procurement of e-voting systems within the
context of procurement of ICT by public bodies (section 4.1) gives new
insight into the problems experienced with many e-voting systems that
have been used for real elections;
 the discussion of verification and maintenance (section 4.4) is missing
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from existing standards and recommendations for e-voting. 2;
 the critique of the Council of Europe requirements (chapter 5) highlights
some flaws in that document which would significantly reduce its
usefulness in the design, verification and maintenance of e-voting
systems, and suggests one route which might be taken to improve the
specification.
Overall the thesis identifies several major barriers to the use of e-voting in
critical elections and suggests routes by which those barriers might be overcome.
Aspects of this thesis would be useful to legislators and election officials as an
introduction to some of the technical issues involved in the use of e-voting, while
other parts would be useful to technologists, particularly those attempting to
develop a definitive set of requirements for e-voting in critical elections.
2This section has now been developed into a joint paper with Paul Gibson called
“Verification and Maintenance of e-voting systems and standards” [116].
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Future Work
In each of the three main topics covered by this thesis, and identified in chapter
2, there remain unanswered questions and unexplored areas. Some of these
could not be answered due to a lack of available data, some would be premature
in the current context, some are simply outside our area of competency. In the
following sections we discuss the most interesting outstanding questions and
consider the skills that would be required to approach them.
8.1 Secrecy versus Accuracy
As discussed in chapter 3, the conflict between secrecy and accuracy is a major
barrier to the use of e-voting for critical elections. That chapter also discusses
some of the weaknesses in the solutions to that conflict that have been proposed
so far. Therefore an important area of future work in e-voting is the search for
a satisfactory remedy to the conflict. Such a solution must not itself violate any
of the election principles identified in section 1.6 (universal, equal, free, secret,
direct and trusted suffrage). It must also: be understandable by individual
voters; not disenfranchise voters; be user-friendly (both in vote casting and vote
checking); not rely to an unreasonable degree on trusting a small number of
auditors; and be implemented under real-world assumptions (e.g. if a robust,
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authenticated broadcast channel is required, the scheme must be explicit about
how such a channel could be implemented).
In section 2.1.1 we identified several questions which were not answered in
this thesis for various reasons, but which might be fruitful for future research.
These questions mainly pertain to points of comparison between proposed
solutions to this conflict, such as: financial cost, level of extra effort required
from election staff, ease of use for voters, voters’ reactions and “comfort” levels,
balance struck between secrecy and accuracy, vulnerability of system to future
technological developments, compatibility with international standards. So far,
many of these systems have only been trialled on a very small scale (such as
university elections), if at all. This research might be more usefully carried out
at a future time when more of these solutions have been implemented under
realistic circumstances.
This type of comparison would be useful to decision makers when choosing
an e-voting system for their context. The priority given to each of these points
of comparison will vary from context to context, so the research is unlikely to
pinpoint a “best” solution. It would, however, help policy makers to determine
the best solution for their context given their priorities.
Since the information sought by this research is quite diverse, it would
require a broad range of skills. For instance, comparing the usability (for
both voters and election staff) of the various systems fairly would require
well-designed usability testing (see section 4.4.1); testing voters’ satisfaction
with the systems would require knowledge of good survey design; discussion
of compatibility with international standards would require a close familiarity
with those standards; and so on. As with so many aspects of the field of e-
voting, the ideal team to carry out this research would be cross-disciplinary and
would include: cryptographers, usability experts, and researchers familiar with
financial analysis, survey design, and international standards.
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8.2 Organizational Barriers
One of the most striking results of the research for chapter 4 was that there
is a lack of available information on procurement of ICT within the public
sector. This hinders the ability of public bodies to learn from their own and
others’ successes and mistakes, and makes it unlikely that the quality of systems
procured will increase. It is also clear that strategies for increasing and retaining
internal expertise need to be developed, so that knowledge of best practice can
be used by individuals representing the public body’s interests. This would
reduce the reliance of public bodies on external information from vendors and
consultants.
One approach to resolving this lack of information would be to introduce a
regular survey of ICT projects in the public sector similar to the one carried out
in the private sector by the Standish Group [75]. Useful data to collect would
include: project cost breakdown (including projections), project success in terms
of delivery time and features, level of involvement of internal staff, level of
involvement of external actors (such as consultants), acceptance of final project
amongst users, techniques applied to the project (with rationale), organizational
structures and rules, and so on. This survey would have to be organized in such
a way that it protected the anonymity of those involved. This would encourage
participation and help participants to see the project as an information-
gathering rather than a blame-laying exercise. The anonymised data could be
analysed quantitatively – giving information about what techniques and best
practices are most effective under what circumstances – as well as qualitatively
– giving anecdotal evidence to help practitioners learn directly from specific
experiences of their peers. The Irish Comptroller and Auditor General recently
released a report on work of this kind [117] though its scope was limited to
projects undertaken within the Republic of Ireland, and under the Government’s
definition of “eGovernment” projects.
Such a survey would require the co-operation of public bodies, perhaps
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enforced from above. The team producing the report would require expertise in
survey design and analysis, as well as familiarity with current best practice in
both the public and private spheres.
Mitigation strategies could be another fruitful area for study. A survey of
strategies for the improvement of ICT procurement (such as those discussed in
section 4.2.6), used in both the public and private sectors around the world,
could yield useful information. It would be particularly useful if the use of these
strategies could be shown to be related to project success.
8.3 Requirements
This thesis identifies the need for a set of requirements for e-voting that is
useful to legislators, election officials and technology developers. While the
requirements proposed here go some way towards meeting that need, there
remains significant work to be done.
The requirements presented here could be further developed to deal with the
limitations already identified in section 6.2. One of the major restrictions on
this work was the lack of input from experts in other disciplines; future work
would require cross-disciplinary participation. A research team – perhaps within
a supra-national organization rather than an academic context – composed of
experienced requirements engineers, legislators, legal experts, election officials
and others could develop a full international standard that met the needs of the
various interested parties and improved the quality of procured e-voting systems.
This standard should include an improved set of requirements (as discussed
below) and also cover: how systems can and should be evaluated against
those requirements; maintenance of the standard itself and of the systems it
describes; and the role of ITAs (see section 4.4). It must be flexible enough to
apply to all existing technologies used in critical elections, and not prevent the
certification of valid new technologies. It is vital that the development process
is not subverted by commercial or political (as opposed to democratic) interests
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(see section 4.3).
The requirements presented here could also be improved in several ways by
such a research team. For example:
 Requirements could be developed to cover stages of the electoral process
(section 1.2.2) not dealt with here,
 Assumptions about system design (e.g. that the system incorporates a
·voting device· – section 6.2) should be removed, perhaps by including
optional sections in the specification,
 A multi-disciplinary review and revision (requirements-engineer-led
negotiation [43]) could ensure that the requirements meet the needs
not only of technologists, but also of legislators, election officials, and
others,
 The use of requirements engineering techniques which were not practical
(see section 6.5) in the preparation of this thesis could lead to further
improvements. For example: risk driven specification [115], data-flow
modelling [43] within specific electoral contexts, and formal methods
[115].
127
Chapter 9
Conclusions
This thesis identifies several barriers to the use of e-voting in critical elections.
Having examined each in turn, we conclude that there are several such barriers
which have not been satisfactorily overcome.
The requirements conflict between secrecy and accuracy increases the risk
of undetected, and uncorrectable, modifications of results by malice or error.
Proposed solutions to that conflict have unresolved problems such as: usability
issues (both cryptographic schemes and voter verification), reliance on trusted
auditors (cryptographic schemes) and procedural burdens (voter verification).
Procurement of ICT systems is a difficult problem, and particularly so in the
public sphere. This reduces the chances of a public body successfully procuring
a high-quality e-voting system. There are legal implications which must be
adequately addressed with regard to the underlying technological issues. These
include the legal position of electoral rules, electoral results and vendors of e-
voting systems.
A requirements catalogue must be developed that adequately captures the
expected behaviour of e-voting systems. Without a clear definition of what e-
voting systems should do, it is impossible to ensure that they do it correctly.
The requirements presented here should prove useful in the development of such
a catalogue, but the current draft retains certain limitations.
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9.1 Analysis of Work Done
9.1.1 Secrecy Versus Accuracy
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the requirements conflict between secrecy and
accuracy framed to highlight why the conflict arises in electronic rather than
paper elections, and why the conflict increases the risk from both malice and
error. It serves to elucidate the conflict as context for the rest of the chapter,
rather than introducing new ideas. We then discuss two approaches to resolving
this conflict, with emphasis on the barriers to using each approach in critical
elections. As part of the discussion on cryptographic voting schemes we include
a description of the underlying design (as well as three example schemes) aimed
at a non-cryptographer audience.
A more in-depth comparison between proposed solutions to the conflict
could be very useful to authorities introducing e-voting. Points of comparison
might include: financial cost, level of extra effort required from election staff,
ease of use for voters, voters’ reactions and “comfort” levels, balance struck
between secrecy and accuracy, vulnerability of system to future technological
developments, compatibility with international standards. See future work
section 8.1.
9.1.2 Organizational Barriers
Chapter 4 puts e-voting in the broader context of ICT procurement in the
public sphere. The discussion of best practice illustrates the effect these
techniques have on ICT project outcome. In the interest of offering a solution
to an identified problem, we include a summary of some mitigation strategies
developed from UK research into public procurement. We identified several
areas where the legal implications of introducing e-voting must be considered,
as well as some of the considerations resulting from the need for verification and
maintenance.
The lack of available data on public procurement severely limited our
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discussion on that subject. While our work does illustrate the likely effects of
best practice on project outcome in the public sphere, it was not as rigorous as
we had hoped. All of the areas addressed in chapter 4 could be better addressed
in a multi-disciplinary environment since none of them are computer science
topics, but in this context all require in-depth knowledge of the technological
issues. See future work section 8.2.
9.1.3 Requirements
Chapters 5 and 6 present our work on developing a catalogue of requirements
for e-voting. We use the Council of Europe’s standards document as an example
to highlight the types of errors that can exist in requirements specifications. We
then present a catalogue of requirements developed from scratch. This catalogue
has many positive attributes (see chapter 7). We developed a glossary of election
terminology (appendix A) as part of this work.
Our requirements are limited in several ways: they only cover part of
the electoral process (vote collection and tabulation), they make some design
assumptions (such as the existence of a ·voting device·) and they do not cover
remote e-voting. They could be further developed to deal with these limitations.
This work could most effectively be done by a multi-disciplinary team. See
future work section 8.3.
9.2 Final Remarks
The introduction of e-voting in critical elections constitutes a major change
in a highly sensitive apparatus of democracy. The increased potential for
negative impact from fraud and error must be taken seriously. We hope that the
work presented here will be useful to ·responsible election authorities· in their
decisions regarding the introduction of e-voting, and to researchers in the field
– particularly in the development of a requirements catalogue that is useful to
legislators, election officials and technology developers.
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Appendix A
Glossary
The terms below have the following meanings in this thesis where they appear
highlighted ·like this·.
A.1 Election Terminology
·ballot·
voting options available in a particular ·poll·
·cast· (verb)
to commit to a particular set of ·selections·, equivalent to putting one’s
completed paper ·vote· into the ·ballot box· in a traditional paper-based
voting system
·election·
the proceedings accompanying the formal choosing of the winner(s) of
one or more ·polls·
·poll·
a decision between options – such as candidates for a position, or choices
in a referendum – which is determined by ·votes· ·cast· by ·eligible voters·
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·selection·
an indication by a ·voter· of some subset of his preferences
·spoil·
to ·cast· a ·vote· which will not be counted for some legitimate reason
(e.g. incorrectly filled-in, or blank)
·vote· (noun only)
the expression of an individual ·voter’s· preference(s)
·voters’ register·
list of ·eligible voters’· details, including whether they have ·cast· their
·vote·
A.2 Phases of the Election (see figure 6.1)
·archiving period·
period after the ·election period· for which ·vote· records must be
retained
·counting phase·
calculation of ·poll· results. This may entail the collection of votes for
tabulation
·election period·
the period from the beginning of the ·election setup·, through the ·polling
period·, to the completion of the ·counting phase·
·election setup·
preparation of devices and personnel for ·polling period·
·polling period·
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period of time when polls are open, i.e. ·votes· can be ·cast·
·voting process·
all interactions of an authorized ·voter· with the ·voting device·. The
·voting process· begins when the ·voting device· is put in an ·active state·
and ends when the voter has cast his ·vote(s)· or cancels the ·voting
process·
A.3 Actors/Entities
·certification authority·
body nominated by the ·responsible election authority· which certifies
the ·election devices’· compliance with requirements
·elector·
an ·eligible voter· who has ·cast· his ·vote(s)·
·eligible voter·
a person who is entitled to ·cast· one or more ·votes·
·manufacturer·
the body responsible for the development and maintenance of ·election
devices· (hardware and software)
·poll-worker·
a person in his role as an official facilitator in the running of an ·election·
·responsible election authority·
the organization responsible for running the ·election·
·independent testing authority·
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body (or bodies) nominated by the ·responsible election authority· which
tests the ·election devices’· compliance with requirements
·user·
anyone who is authorized to interact with an ·election device· during the
·election period·
·voter·
a person in his role as ·caster· of a ·vote·
A.4 Devices and Components
·system·
a set of devices and methods
·audit system·
sub-system of the ·e-voting system· which allows the actual behaviour
of the ·e-voting system· to be audited
·ballot box·
physical box in which tangible ·vote· records (usually paper) are stored
·counting software·
software which calculates ·poll· results
·election device·
any hardware and/or software component involved in the ·e-voting
system· e.g., ·voting devices· and ·counting software·
·e-ballot box·
·system· in which ·e-votes· are stored
·e-voting system·
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a ·system· for the electronic collection of ·votes· and calculation of
results, including e.g. the ·election devices· and ·poll-workers·
·e-vote·
an electronic copy of a ·vote·
·poll-worker interface·
user-interface to ·election devices· which enables ·poll-workers· to carry
out their duties
·vote-casting interface·
user-interface through which an authenticated ·voter· may cast his
·vote(s)· or cancel the ·voting process·
·voting channel·
a medium through which ·voters· can ·cast· ·votes·
·voting device·
the device on which ·voters· ·cast· their ·votes· in the polling booth
·active state·
the ·voting device· is in an ·active state· if it is capable of accepting
a ·voter’s· ·selections· and ·votes· can be ·cast· (or the ·voting process·
cancelled)
·inactive state·
the ·voting device· is in an ·inactive state· if it is incapable of accepting a
·voter’s· ·selections· and no ·votes· can be ·cast· (nor the ·voting process·
cancelled)
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Council of Europe
Requirements for E-voting
This appendix quotes verbatim from Recommendation Rec(2004)11 adopted by
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 30 September 2004
– Legal, Operational and Technical Standards for E-voting (with additional
annotation, described below). The copyright for the quoted text is held by the
Council of Europe, and it is included with permission.
The requirements are arranged in that document under three appendices:
Principles, Operational Standards, and Technical Requirements; the original
nomenclature is retained here. For the full text of the recommendation,
including an explanatory memorandum, see [40]. For the sake of ease of reference
from chapters 5 and 6, divisions have been added to some of these requirements;
they are indicated by boldface letters in square brackets (e.g. [a]).
Legal standards
Appendix I
A. Principles
I. Universal suffrage
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1. [a] The voter interface of an e-voting system shall be understandable [b] and
easily usable.
2. Possible registration requirements for e-voting shall not pose an impediment
to the voter participating in e-voting.
3. E-voting systems shall be designed, as far as it is practicable, to maximize
the opportunities that such systems can provide for persons with disabilities.
4. Unless channels of remote e-voting are universally accessible, they shall be
only an additional and optional means of voting.
II. Equal suffrage
5. [a] In relation to any election or referendum, a voter shall be prevented from
inserting more than one ballot into the electronic ballot box. [b] A voter shall
be authorized to vote only if it has been established that his/her ballot has not
yet been inserted into the ballot box.
6. The e-voting system shall prevent any voter from casting a vote by more
than one voting channel.
7. Every vote deposited in an electronic ballot box shall be counted, and each
vote cast in the election or referendum shall be counted only once.
8. Where electronic and non-electronic voting channels are used in the same
election or referendum, there shall be a secure and reliable method to aggregate
all votes and to calculate the correct result.
III. Free suffrage
9. The organization of e-voting shall secure the free formation and expression
of the voter’s opinion and, where required, the personal exercise of the right to
vote.
10. The way in which voters are guided through the e-voting process shall be
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such as to prevent their voting precipitately or without reflection.
11. [a] Voters shall be able to alter their choice at any point in the e-voting
process before casting their vote, or to break off the procedure, [b] without their
previous choices being recorded or made available to any other person.
12. The e-voting system shall not permit any manipulative influence to be
exercised over the voter during the voting.
13. The e-voting system shall provide the voter with a means of participating
in an election or referendum without the voter exercising a preference for any
of the voting options, for example, by casting a blank vote.
14. The e-voting system shall indicate clearly to the voter when the vote has
been cast successfully and when the whole voting procedure has been completed.
15. The e-voting system shall prevent the changing of a vote once that vote has
been cast.
IV. Secret suffrage
16. E-voting shall be organized in such a way as to exclude at any stage of
the voting procedure and, in particular, at voter authentication, anything that
would endanger the secrecy of the vote.
17. The e-voting system shall guarantee that votes in the electronic ballot box
and votes being counted are, and will remain, anonymous, and that it is not
possible to reconstruct a link between the vote and the voter.
18. The e-voting system shall be so designed that the expected number of votes
in any electronic ballot box will not allow the result to be linked to individual
voters.
19. Measures shall be taken to ensure that the information needed during
electronic processing cannot be used to breach the secrecy of the vote.
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B. Procedural safeguards
I. Transparency
20. Member states shall take steps to ensure that voters understand and have
confidence in the e-voting system in use.
21. Information on the functioning of an e-voting system shall be made publicly
available.
22. Voters shall be provided with an opportunity to practise any new method of
e-voting before, and separately from, the moment of casting an electronic vote.
23. Any observers, to the extent permitted by law, shall be able to be present
to observe and comment on the e-elections, including the establishing of the
results.
II. Verifiability and accountability
24. The components of the e-voting system shall be disclosed, at least to the
competent electoral authorities, as required for verification and certification
purposes.
25. Before any e-voting system is introduced, and at appropriate intervals
thereafter, and in particular after any changes are made to the system, an
independent body, appointed by the electoral authorities, shall verify that the
e-voting system is working correctly and that all the necessary security measures
have been taken.
26. [a] There shall be the possibility for a recount. [b] Other features of
the e-voting system that may influence the correctness of the results shall be
verifiable.
27. The e-voting system shall not prevent the partial or complete re-run of an
election or a referendum.
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III. Reliability and security
28. The member state’s authorities shall ensure the reliability and security of
the e-voting system.
29. All possible steps shall be taken to avoid the possibility of fraud or
unauthorized intervention affecting the system during the whole voting process.
30. The e-voting system shall contain measures to preserve the availability of its
services during the e-voting process. It shall resist, in particular, malfunction,
breakdowns or denial of service attacks.
31. Before any e-election or e-referendum takes place, the competent electoral
authority shall satisfy itself that the e-voting system is genuine and operates
correctly.
32. [a] Only persons appointed by the electoral authority shall have access to
the central infrastructure, the servers and the election data. There shall be clear
rules established for such appointments. [b] Critical technical activities shall
be carried out by teams of at least two people. The composition of the teams
shall be regularly changed. As far as possible, such activities shall be carried
out outside election periods.
33. [a] While an electronic ballot box is open, any authorized intervention
affecting the system shall be carried out by teams of at least two people, be the
subject of a report, be monitored by representatives of the competent electoral
authority and [b] any election observers.
34. [a] The e-voting system shall maintain the availability and integrity of
the votes. [b] It shall also maintain the confidentiality of the votes and keep
them sealed until the counting process. [c] If stored or communicated outside
controlled environments, the votes shall be encrypted.
35. Votes and voter information shall remain sealed as long as the data is held
in a manner where they can be associated. Authentication information shall be
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separated from the voter’s decision at a pre-defined stage in the e-election or
e-referendum.
Appendix II
Operational standards
I. Notification
36. Domestic legal provisions governing an e-election or e-referendum shall
provide for clear timetables concerning all stages of the election or referendum,
both before and after the election or referendum.
37. The period in which an electronic vote can be cast shall not begin before
the notification of an election or a referendum. Particularly with regard to
remote e-voting, the period shall be defined and made known to the public well
in advance of the start of voting.
38. The voters shall be informed, well in advance of the start of voting, in clear
and simple language, of the way in which the e-voting will be organized, and
any steps a voter may have to take in order to participate and vote.
II. Voters
39. There shall be a voters’ register which is regularly updated. The voter shall
be able to check, as a minimum, the information which is held about him/her
on the register, and request corrections.
40. The possibility of creating an electronic register and introducing a
mechanism allowing online application for voter registration and, if applicable,
for application to use e-voting, shall be considered. If participation in e-
voting requires a separate application by the voter and/or additional steps,
an electronic, and, where possible, interactive procedure shall be considered.
41. In cases where there is an overlap between the period for voter registration
and the voting period, provision for appropriate voter authentication shall be
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made.
III. Candidates
42. The possibility of introducing online candidate nomination may be
considered.
43. A list of candidates that is generated and made available electronically shall
also be publicly available by other means.
IV. Voting
44. It is particularly important, where remote e-voting takes place while polling
stations are open, that the system shall be so designed that it prevents any
voter from voting more than once.
45. Remote e-voting may start and/or end at an earlier time than the opening
of any polling station. Remote e-voting shall not continue after the end of the
voting period at polling stations.
46. [a] For every e-voting channel, support and guidance arrangements on voting
procedures shall be set up for, and be available to, the voter. [b] In the case of
remote e-voting, such arrangements shall also be available through a different,
widely available communication channel.
47. There shall be equality in the manner of presentation of all voting options
on the device used for casting an electronic vote.
48. The electronic ballot by which an electronic vote is cast shall be free from any
information about voting options, other than that strictly required for casting
the vote. The e-voting system shall avoid the display of other messages that
may influence the voters’ choice.
49. If it is decided that information about voting options will be accessible from
the e-voting site, this information shall be presented with equality.
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50. Before casting a vote using a remote e-voting system, voters’ attention shall
be explicitly drawn to the fact that the e-election or e-referendum in which they
are submitting their decision by electronic means is a real election or referendum.
In case of tests, participants shall have their attention drawn explicitly to the
fact that they are not participating in a real election or referendum and shall –
when tests are continued at election times – at the same time be invited to cast
their ballot by the voting channel(s) available for that purpose.
51. A remote e-voting system shall not enable the voter to be in possession of
a proof of the content of the vote cast.
52. [a] In a supervised environment, the information on the vote shall disappear
from the visual, audio or tactile display used by the voter to cast the vote as
soon as it has been cast. [b] Where a paper proof of the electronic vote is
provided to the voter at a polling station, the voter shall not be able to show it
to any other person, or take this proof outside of the polling station.
V. Results
53. [a] The e-voting system shall not allow the disclosure of the number of votes
cast for any voting option until after the closure of the electronic ballot box.
[b] This information shall not be disclosed to the public until after the end of
the voting period.
54. The e-voting system shall prevent processing information on votes cast
within deliberately chosen sub-units that could reveal individual voters’ choices.
55. Any decoding required for the counting of the votes shall be carried out as
soon as practicable after the closure of the voting period.
56. When counting the votes, representatives of the competent electoral
authority shall be able to participate in, and any observers able to observe,
the count.
57. A record of the counting process of the electronic votes shall be kept,
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including information about the start and end of, and the persons involved in,
the count.
58. In the event of any irregularity affecting the integrity of votes, the affected
votes shall be recorded as such.
VI. Audit
59. The e-voting system shall be auditable.
60. The conclusions drawn from the audit process shall be applied in future
elections and referendums.
Appendix III
Technical requirements
The design of an e-voting system shall be underpinned by a comprehensive
assessment of the risks1 involved in the successful completion of the particular
election or referendum. The e-voting system shall include the appropriate
safeguards, based on this risk assessment, to manage the specific risks identified.
Service failure or service degradation shall be kept within pre-defined limits.
A. Accessibility
61. [a] Measures shall be taken to ensure that the relevant software and services
can be used by all voters [b] and, if necessary, provide access to alternative ways
of voting.
62. Users shall be involved in the design of e-voting systems, particularly to
identify constraints and test ease of use at each main stage of the development
process.
63. Users shall be supplied, whenever required and possible, with additional
facilities, such as special interfaces or other equivalent resources, such as
1The need for a risk assessment is not identified within the CoE requirements other than
in this paragraph. We refer to this paragraph from chapters 5 and 6 as III.
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personal assistance. User facilities shall comply as much as possible with the
guidelines set out in the Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI).
64. Consideration shall be given, when developing new products, to their
compatibility with existing ones, including those using technologies designed
to help people with disabilities.
65. The presentation of the voting options shall be optimized for the voter.
B. Interoperability
66. Open standards shall be used to ensure that the various technical
components or services of an e-voting system, possibly derived from a variety
of sources, interoperate.
67. At present, the Election Markup Language (EML) standard is such an
open standard and in order to guarantee interoperability, EML shall be used
whenever possible for e-election and e-referendum applications. The decision of
when to adopt EML is a matter for member states. The EML standard valid
at the time of adoption of this recommendation, and supporting documentation
are available on the Council of Europe website.
68. In cases which imply specific election or referendum data requirements, a
localization procedure shall be used to accommodate these needs. This would
allow for extending or restricting the information to be provided, whilst still
remaining compatible with the generic version of EML. The recommended
procedure is to use structured schema languages and pattern languages.
C. Systems operation
(for the central infrastructure and clients in controlled environments)
69. [a] The competent electoral authorities shall publish an official list of the
software used in an e-election or e-referendum. Member states may exclude
from this list data protection software for security reasons. At the very least
it shall indicate the software used, the versions, its date of installation and a
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brief description. [b] A procedure shall be established for regularly installing
updated versions and corrections of the relevant protection software. It shall be
possible to check the state of protection of the voting equipment at any time.
70. [a] Those responsible for operating the equipment shall draw up a
contingency procedure. [b] Any backup system shall conform to the same
standards and requirements as the original system.
71. [a] Sufficient backup arrangements shall be in place and be permanently
available to ensure that voting proceeds smoothly. [b] The staff concerned
shall be ready to intervene rapidly according to a procedure drawn up by the
competent electoral authorities.
72. [a] Those responsible for the equipment shall use special procedures
to ensure that during the polling period the voting equipment and its use
satisfy requirements. [b] The backup services shall be regularly supplied with
monitoring protocols.
73. Before each election or referendum, the equipment shall be checked and
approved in accordance with a protocol drawn up by the competent electoral
authorities. The equipment shall be checked to ensure that it complies with
technical specifications. The findings shall be submitted to the competent
electoral authorities.
74. [a] All technical operations shall be subject to a formal control procedure.
[b] Any substantial changes to key equipment shall be notified.
75. [a] Key e-election or e-referendum equipment shall be located in a secure
area and that area shall, throughout the election or referendum period, be
guarded against interference of any sort and from any person. [b] During the
election or referendum period a physical disaster recovery plan shall be in place.
[c] Furthermore, any data retained after the election or referendum period shall
be stored securely.
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76. Where incidents that could threaten the integrity of the system occur, those
responsible for operating the equipment shall immediately inform the competent
electoral authorities, who will take the necessary steps to mitigate the effects of
the incident. The level of incident which shall be reported shall be specified in
advance by the electoral authorities.
D. Security
I. General requirements
(referring to pre-voting, voting, and post-voting stages)
77. Technical and organizational measures shall be taken to ensure that no data
will be permanently lost in the event of a breakdown or a fault affecting the
e-voting system.
78. [a] The e-voting system shall maintain the privacy of individuals. [b]
Confidentiality of voters’ registers stored in or communicated by the e-voting
system shall be maintained.
79. [a] The e-voting system shall perform regular checks to ensure that its
components operate in accordance with its technical specifications [b] and that
its services are available.
80. The e-voting system shall restrict access to its services, depending on the
user identity or the user role, to those services explicitly assigned to this user
or role. User authentication shall be effective before any action can be carried
out.
81. The e-voting system shall protect authentication data so that unauthorized
entities cannot misuse, intercept, modify, or otherwise gain knowledge of all
or some of this data. In uncontrolled environments, authentication based on
cryptographic mechanisms is advisable.
82. Identification of voters and candidates in a way that they can unmistakably
be distinguished from other persons (unique identification) shall be ensured.
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83. [a] E-voting systems shall generate reliable and sufficiently detailed
observation data so that election observation can be carried out. [b] The time
at which an event generated observation data shall be reliably determinable. [c]
The authenticity, availability and integrity of the data shall be maintained.
84. The e-voting system shall maintain reliable synchronized time sources.
The accuracy of the time source shall be sufficient to maintain time marks
for audit trails and observations data, as well as for maintaining the time limits
for registration, nomination, voting, or counting.
85. Electoral authorities have overall responsibility for compliance with these
security requirements, which shall be assessed by independent bodies. II.
Requirements in pre-voting stages (and for data communicated to the voting
stage)
86. The authenticity, availability and integrity of the voters’ registers and lists of
candidates shall be maintained. The source of the data shall be authenticated.
Provisions on data protection shall be respected.
87. The fact that candidate nomination and, if required, the decision of the
candidate and/or the competent electoral authority to accept a nomination has
happened within the prescribed time limits shall be ascertainable.
88. The fact that voter registration has happened within the prescribed time
limits shall be ascertainable.
III. Requirements in the voting stage
(and for data communicated during post-election stages)
89. The integrity of data communicated from the pre-voting stage (e.g. voters’
registers and lists of candidates) shall be maintained. Data-origin authentication
shall be carried out.
90. [a] It shall be ensured that the e-voting system presents an authentic ballot
to the voter. [b] In the case of remote e-voting, the voter shall be informed about
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the means to verify that a connection to the official server has been established
and that the authentic ballot has been presented.
91. The fact that a vote has been cast within the prescribed time limits shall
be ascertainable.
92. Sufficient means shall be provided to ensure that the systems that are used
by the voters to cast the vote can be protected against influence that could
modify the vote.
93. [a] Residual information holding the voter’s decision or the display of the
voter’s choice shall be destroyed after the vote has been cast. [b] In the case of
remote e-voting, the voter shall be provided with information on how to delete,
where that is possible, traces of the vote from the device used to cast the vote.
94. [a] The e-voting system shall at first ensure that a user who tries to vote is
eligible to vote. The e-voting system shall authenticate the voter and [b] shall
ensure that only the appropriate number of votes per voter is cast and stored
in the electronic ballot box.
95. The e-voting system shall ensure that the voter’s choice is accurately
represented in the vote and that the sealed vote enters the electronic ballot
box.
96. After the end of the e-voting period, no voter shall be allowed to gain access
to the e-voting system. However, the acceptance of electronic votes into the
electronic ballot box shall remain open for a sufficient period of time to allow
for any delays in the passing of messages over the e-voting channel.
IV. Requirements in post-voting stages
97. The integrity of data communicated during the voting stage (e.g.
votes, voters’ registers, lists of candidates) shall be maintained. Data-origin
authentication shall be carried out.
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98. The counting process shall accurately count the votes. The counting of
votes shall be reproducible.
99. The e-voting system shall maintain the availability and integrity of the
electronic ballot box and the output of the counting process as long as required.
E. Audit
I. General
100. The audit system shall be designed and implemented as part of the e-
voting system. Audit facilities shall be present on different levels of the system:
logical, technical and application.
101. End-to-end auditing of an e-voting system shall include recording,
providing monitoring facilities and providing verification facilities. Audit
systems with the features set out in sections II – V below shall therefore be
used to meet these requirements.
II. Recording
102. The audit system shall be open and comprehensive, and actively report on
potential issues and threats.
103. The audit system shall record times, events and actions, including:
a. all voting-related information, including the number of eligible voters,
the number of votes cast, the number of invalid votes, the counts and
recounts, etc.;
b. any attacks on the operation of the e-voting system and its communica-
tions infrastructure;
c. system failures, malfunctions and other threats to the system.
III. Monitoring
104. The audit system shall provide the ability to oversee the election or
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referendum and to verify that the results and procedures are in accordance
with the applicable legal provisions.
105. Disclosure of the audit information to unauthorized persons shall be
prevented.
106. The audit system shall maintain voter anonymity at all times.
IV. Verifiability
107. The audit system shall provide the ability to cross-check and verify the
correct operation of the e-voting system and the accuracy of the result, to detect
voter fraud and to prove that all counted votes are authentic and that all votes
have been counted.
108. The audit system shall provide the ability to verify that an e-election or
e-referendum has complied with the applicable legal provisions, the aim being
to verify that the results are an accurate representation of the authentic votes.
V. Other
109. The audit system shall be protected against attacks which may corrupt,
alter or lose records in the audit system.
110. Member states shall take adequate steps to ensure that the confidentiality
of any information obtained by any person while carrying out auditing functions
is guaranteed.
F. Certification
111. Member states shall introduce certification processes that allow for any
ICT (Information and Communication Technology) component to be tested
and certified as being in conformity with the technical requirements described
in this recommendation.
112. In order to enhance international co-operation and avoid duplication
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of work, member states shall consider whether their respective agencies shall
join, if they have not done so already, relevant international mutual recognition
arrangements such as the European Co-operation for Accreditation (EA), the
International Laboratory Accreditation Co-operation (ILAC), the International
Accreditation Forum (IAF) and other bodies of a similar nature.
All rights reserved. No part of this appendix may be reproduced or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic (CD-Rom, Internet, etc.) or
mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publishing Division,
Communication and Research Directorate.
This appendix ©Council of Europe
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Appendix C
Requirements Catalogues
Compared
Our requirements were greatly improved by comparison with existing catalogues.
The development of each one of the following tables (indicating the mapping
between these catalogues and ours) resulted in further modifications to our
requirements.
C.1 Council of Europe Requirements
The Council of Europe requirements catalogue is discussed at length in chapter
5.
Table C.1: Mapping from Council of Europe requirements to ours
1a Usab 2, Org 8, Org 9
1b Usab 1
2 not applicable to the systems under consideration
3 Usab 3, Funct 11
4 not applicable to the systems under consideration
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5a Sec 2
5b as per paper-only elections
6 not applicable to the systems under consideration
7 Sec 22
8 not applicable to the systems under consideration
9 as per paper-only elections
10 Usab 6
11a Funct 12
11b Sec 12
12 Funct 3
13 Funct 12
14 Usab 5
15 Sec 20
16 Sec 13, Sec 14
17 Sec 13, Sec 14
18 as per paper-only elections
19 Sec 13, Sec 14
20 Org 5, Org 8
21 Org 5
22 Org 8
23 Org 2, Audit 4
24 Assur 6, Org 5
25 Assur 7, Assur 10, Assur 11
26a Funct 8
26b Sec 1
27 Funct 8
28 Org 2, Org 3, Org 4, Org 5, Org 7, Assur 9, Assur 10, Assur 11,
Assur 12
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29 Sec 18, Org 3
30 Sec 8
31 Sec 19, Org 3
32 Sec 4, Org 2
33 Sec 4, Org 2
34a Sec 24, Sec 17, Sec 3, Sec 20
34b Sec 13, Sec 14
34c over specification in this context
35 Sec 13, Sec 14
36 as per paper-only elections
37 as per paper-only elections
38 Org 8
39 as per paper-only elections
40 not applicable to the systems under consideration
41 not applicable to the systems under consideration
42 not applicable to the systems under consideration
43 not applicable to the systems under consideration
44 not applicable to the systems under consideration
45 not applicable to the systems under consideration
46a Org 8
46b not applicable to the systems under consideration
47 Funct 3
48 as per paper-only elections
49 not applicable to the systems under consideration
50 not applicable to the systems under consideration
51 not applicable to the systems under consideration
52a Sec 12
52b Org 3
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53a Sec 16
53b as per paper-only elections
54 as per paper-only elections
55 over specification in this context
56 Org 2, Audit 4
57 Sec 5
58 Sec 5
59 Sec 5
60 outside the scope of these requirements
III Assur 9
61 Org 8, Usab 3, Funct 11
62 Assur 8
63 Usab 3, Funct 11
64 Funct 11
65 Usab 1
66 Assur 7 (over specification in this context)
67 over specification in this context
68 over specification in this context
69a Org 5
69b Org 3
70 Org 4
71a Org 4
71b Org 10
72a Assur 10, Assur 11
72b indecipherable
73 Org 3, Org 10
74 Org 3, Org 2, Sec 4
75a Org 3
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75b Org 4
75c Org 6
76 Org 2
77 Sec 3, Org 3, Org 10
78a Sec 13
78b not applicable to the systems under consideration
79 Org 3
80 Org 2, Sec 4
81 Org 2, Sec 4
82 as per paper-only elections
83a Sec 5
83b Audit 7
83c Audit 6
84 Audit 7 (see also section 5.6.4)
85 outside the scope of these requirements
86 not applicable to the systems under consideration
87 not applicable to the systems under consideration
88 outside the scope of these requirements
89 not applicable to the systems under consideration
90a Funct 6
90b not applicable to the systems under consideration
91 as per paper-only elections
92 Sec 18, Sec 20
93a Sec 12
93b not applicable to the systems under consideration
94a as per paper-only elections
94b Sec 2
95 Funct 6
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96 Funct 6, Sec 22
97 Sec 17
98 Sec 22, Funct 8
99 Sec 20, Org 6
100 Sec 5
101 Sec 5
102 Sec 5
103 Audit 1
104 Org 2, Audit 4
105 Audit 4
106 Audit 8
107 Sec 5
108 Sec 5
109 Audit 5
110 outside the scope of these requirements
111 Org 1
112 outside the scope of these requirements
C.2 Requirements from Chapter 5
The requirements in chapter 5 (originally published in [41]) were developed as
part of a critical analysis of the CoE standards in an attempt to overcome some
of the faults identified.
Table C.2: Mapping from requirements in chapter 5 to those in this chapter
1 Org 4
1.1 Org 4
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1.2 Org 4
1.3 Org 9
1.4 Sec 8
1.5 not applicable to the systems under consideration
1.6 not applicable to the systems under consideration
2 Usab 1
2.1 Usab 2, Usab 5
2.2 Assur 8
2.3 Usab 3, Funct 11
3 Org 8
3.1 outside the scope of these requirements
3.2 outside the scope of these requirements
3.3 not applicable to the systems under consideration
4 Sec 2
5 outside the scope of these requirements
6 Sec 22
7 as per paper-only elections
8 as per paper-only elections
9 as per paper-only elections
10 Funct 3
11 Sec 16
12 Funct 12
13 Sec 13
13.1 Sec 13
13.2 Sec 13
13.3 Org 3
13.4 Funct 12, Sec 12
13.5 not applicable to the systems under consideration
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13.6 Audit 8
14 Funct 6
14.1 Funct 7
14.2 Funct 6
15 Sec 20, Sec 1
16 Sec 22
16.1 Sec 22
17 Org 2
17.1 Sec 5
17.2 Org 2
18 Sec 5
18.1 Audit 1, Audit 2
18.2 Audit 1
18.3 Audit 4
18.4 Audit 3
18.5 Audit 2
19 Assur 2, Assur 11
19.1 Assur 9
19.2 Sec 15
19.3 Org 3
19.3(a) Assur 2
19.3(b) Sec 19
19.3(c) Org 3
19.3(d) Assur 2
19.3(e) Assur 2
19.4 over specification in this context
19.5 Org 1
19.6 Org 1
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19.7 Org 5
19.8 Sec 8, Org 4
19.8(a) Org 4
19.8(b) Sec 3, Org 4
20 Sec 1 – Sec 25
20.1 Org 6, Sec 17, Audit 6
20.2 Org 2, Sec 4, Audit 4
20.3 Org 3, Org 2
20.4 Sec 19, Org 3
20.5 Org 2
20.6 Org 3, Org 2, Sec 4
20.6(a) Org 2
20.6(b) Org 2
20.6(c) Org 2
20.6(d) Org 2
20.6(e) Org 3, Sec 4
20.6(f) Org 2
20.6(g) Org 3, Sec 4
20.6(h) Org 3
21 Sec 1, Org 7
21.1 Org 8, Org 5
C.3 German Regulations for Voting Devices
The newest version of the German Regulations for Voting Devices [37] dates
back to 1999. These requirements are very specific and in some points even
over specified. The regulations distinguish between organizational and technical
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requirements and they define the responsibilities for (re) evaluation, certification
and revocation, but not the evaluation process itself.
Table C.3: Mapping from German Regulations for Voting Devices (BWahlGV)
to our requirements
BWahlGV
1 Org 1
2(1) outside the scope of these requirements
2(2) outside the scope of these requirements
2(3,4) Org 1
2(5) Org 5
2(6) Org 1
3 Org 1
4(1) Org 5
4(2) as per paper-only elections
5 as per paper-only elections
6a outside the scope of these requirements
6b Org 5
7(1)a Assur 5
7(1)b Org 10
7(2) Org 3
7(3) Org 9
8(1) Org 3
8(2) Org 3
8(3) Org 9
8(4) Org 9
8(5) Org 9
8(6) Org 1
174
Appendix C: Requirements Catalogues Compared
9(1) as per paper-only elections
9(2) as per paper-only elections
10(1) Org 3
10(2)a over specification in this context
10(2)b Org 2, Org 10
11(1) as per paper-only elections
11(2) as per paper-only elections
11(3) Sec 2
11(4) Org 4
11(5) Org 3
12 Org 3
13 Org 3
14 Org 3
14(1) Org 3
14(2) outside the scope of these requirements
14(3) Org 3
14(4) over specification in this context
14(5) Org 3
14(6) removed by catalogue authors
15(1) Org 3
15(2) Org 4
15(3) Org 3
16(1) Org 3
16(2) Org 3
17(1) Org 3
17(2) Org 6
17(3) Org 3
18 not applicable to the systems under consideration
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19 removed by catalogue authors
20 not applicable to the systems under consideration
BWahlGV Appendix 1
A a-e outside the scope of these requirements
A f Assur 4
B 1 Assur 5
B 2.1a Assur 2
B 2.1b Sec 18
B 2.2 Sec 8, Assur 3, Org 3, Assur 5
B 2.3 Sec 3, Sec 8
B 2.4a Sec 2, Sec 20, Assur 1, Funct 2
B 2.4b Sec 21
B 2.5 Sec 8
B 2.6a outside the scope of these requirements
B 2.6b Org 3
B 3.1a outside the scope of these requirements
B 3.1b Sec 2, Funct 12
B 3.1c,d Usab 1
B 3.2a over specification in this context
B 3.2b Sec 9
B 3.3a,b Funct 3
B 3.3c Funct 6
B 3.3d Funct 12
B 3.3e Funct 6
B 3.3f Funct 10
B 3.4a Funct 9
B 3.4b over specification in this context
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B 3.4c over specification in this context
B 3.4d Sec 22
B 3.4e Funct 4, Sec 3
B 3.4f Sec 16, Sec 17, Funct 1
B 3.4g Funct 1, Sec 13
B 3.4h Funct 8
B 3.5a Sec 6, Sec 7, Usab 1
B 3.5b Assur 1
B 3.5c Sec 17
B 3.5d Sec 2
B 3.5e Org 3, Sec 17
B 3.6a,b Sec 2
B 3.6c Funct 1
B 3.6d Funct 12, Sec 9, Usab 6
B 3.7a Usab 2
B 3.7b over specification in this context
B 3.7c Sec 8
B 4 Assur 5
C.4 PTB Requirements
Requirements for “Online-Voting Systems for Non-parliamentary Elections
networked polling-station elections” were developed by the PTB (Physikalisch-
Technische Bundesanstalt) [38]. The catalogue contains technical and organiza-
tional requirements and is based on an analysis of other available requirement
catalogues. The requirements are classified according to election phases
(Preparation of election = ·election setup·, Voting phase = ·polling period·,
Determination of election result = ·counting phase·, Wrap-up and safe-keeping
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= ·archiving period·). Where requirements apply across multiple phases or to
the whole ·election· they are classified as “cross-sectional functions”
Table C.4: Mapping from PTB Requirements to ours
Preparation of election (PE)
PE 1-1 as per paper-only elections
PE 1-2 Usab 1
PE 2 (1-6) not applicable to the systems under consideration
PE 3-1 Usab 1, Assur 5
PE 4-1 Assur 5
PE 4-2 Assur 5, Org 8
PE 4-3 Org 2, Sec 4, Org 3
PE 4-4 Org 2
PE 4-5 as per paper-only elections
PE 4-6 not applicable to the systems under consideration
PE 4-7 as per paper-only elections
PE 4-8 Assur 7, Assur 10, Assur 11
PE 4-9 Assur 7
PE 4-10 over specification in this context
PE 4-11 Org 11, Org 4
PE 4-12 Org 4
Voting phase (VP)
VP 1-1 as per paper-only elections
VP 1-2 Sec 13
VP 1-3 not applicable to the systems under consideration
VP 1-4 not applicable to the systems under consideration
VP 1-5 not applicable to the systems under consideration
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VP 1-6 Sec 2
VP 1-7 Funct 5, Usab 1
VP 2 (1-5) not applicable to the systems under consideration
VP 3-1 Funct 7
VP 3-2 Funct 7
VP 3-3 Org 3
VP 3-4 Funct 3
VP 3-5 Funct 3
VP 3-6 Org 8
VP 3-7 Funct 1, Funct 2
VP 3-8 Funct 6
VP 3-9 Sec 3, Sec 9, Sec 10
VP 3-10 Funct 12, Sec 9
VP 3-11 Funct 12
VP 3-12 Usab 1
VP 3-13 Sec 2
VP 3-14 Usab 6
VP 3-15 Sec 13
VP 3-16 Sec 12
VP 3-17 Sec 2
VP 3-18 Usab 5
VP 3-19 Usab 5
VP 4-1 Funct 6
VP 4-2 Funct 6
VP 4-3 Sec 16, Sec 20
VP 4-4 Sec 17
VP 4-5 Org 3
VP 4-6 Sec 22
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VP 4-7 Org 4
VP 5-1 Sec 22
VP 5-2 Sec 20
VP 5-3 Sec 3
VP 5-4 not applicable to the systems under consideration
VP 5-5 Org 4, Assur 5
VP 5-6 Sec 16
Determination of election result (DR)
DR 1-1 Org 3
DR 1-2 Sec 3
DR 1-3 Org 3
DR 1-4 Org 3
DR 1-5 Usab 1
DR 2-1 Sec 16
DR 2-2 Sec 22
DR 2-3 Sec 22
DR 2-4 Usab 1
DR 2-5 Funct 8
DR 2-6 Funct 8
DR 2-7 Sec 17
Wrap-up and safe-keeping (WS)
WS 1-1 Org 6
WS 1-2 Sec 7, Org 3
WS 2-1 Org 3
WS 2-2 Org 6
WS 2-3 Org 2
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WS 2-4 Org 3
WS 2-5 Org 6
WS 2-6 Org 3
Cross-sectional functions (CF)
CF 1-1 Assur 6
CF 1-2 Sec 25, Assur 4
CF 1-3 Assur 10, Assur 11
CF 1-4 Assur 2, Assur 5
CF 1-5 Assur 2
CF 1-6 Assur 5
CF 1-7 Sec 8
CF 1-8 Assur 3
CF 1-9 Sec 3, Sec 8, Sec 20, Sec 13
CF 1-10 not applicable to the systems under consideration
CF 1-11 Org 4
CF 1-12 Sec 10
CF 1-13 Org 4
CF 2-1 not applicable to the systems under consideration
CF 2-2 Sec 17, Sec 24, Audit 6
CF 2-3 Org 4
CF 2-4 Org 4
CF 2-5 Org 4
CF 2-6 Sec 17, Sec 24, Audit 6
CF 3-1 Sec 13
CF 3-2 Sec 13
CF 3-3 Assur 6
CF 3-4 Assur 11, Assur 10
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CF 3-5 not applicable to the systems under consideration
CF 3-6 Org 2
CF 4-1 Sec 5
CF 4-2 Audit 8
CF 4-3 Sec 5, Audit 2
CF 4-4 Audit 5
C.5 Michael Shamos’ “Commandments”
In 1993 Michael Shamos presented a paper titled Electronic Voting - Evaluating
the Threat [119] which contained the following “commandments”. Though
somewhat tongue-in-cheek, they capture the high-level requirements of e-voting.
Table C.5: Mapping from Michael Shamos’ “Commandments” to our
requirements
I. Thou shalt keep each voter’s choices an inviolable secret. Sec 13
II. Thou shalt allow each eligible voter to vote only once,
and only for those offices for which she is authorized to cast
a vote.
Sec 2
III. Thou shalt not permit tampering with thy voting system,
nor the exchange of gold for votes.
Sec 18,
Sec 20
IV. Thou shalt report all votes accurately. Funct 6
V. Thy voting system shall remain operable throughout each
election.
Org 4
VI. Thou shalt keep an audit trail to detect sins against
Commandments II-IV, but thy audit trail shall not violate
Commandment I.
Sec 1,
Sec 5,
Audit 8
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C.6 Summary Table
Table C.6: Summary of our requirements: principles upheld; whether covered by
other catalogues; evaluation technique(s); whether contains ·responsible election
authority· variable
Req. [un] [eq] [fr] [se] [di] [tr] New 1 Eval. 2 Var. 3
Sec 1 X X 4
Sec 2 X 4 X
Sec 3 X 4
Sec 4 X X X X X X 4
Sec 5 X X X X X X 4 X
Sec 6 X X 4
Sec 7 X 4 6
Sec 8 X 4 X
Sec 9 X 4
Sec 10 X 4
Sec 11 X X 4
Sec 12 X 4
Sec 13 X 4, 6
Sec 14 X 4
Sec 15 X X X 4
Sec 16 X X 4
Sec 17 X 4 X
Sec 18 X X X X X X 4
Sec 19 X X X X X X 4
1Not covered by other catalogues
2Evaluation technique(s) – see section 4.4
3Requires definition of ·responsible election authority· variable – see section 6.3
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Req. [un] [eq] [fr] [se] [di] [tr] New Eval. Var.
Sec 20 X 4
Sec 21 X 4
Sec 22 X 4
Sec 23 X X 4 6
Sec 24 X 4
Sec 25 X 4
Funct 1 X 4
Funct 2 X 4
Funct 3 X 4
Funct 4 X 4
Funct 5 X 4
Funct 6 X X 4
Funct 7 X 4
Funct 8 X 4
Funct 9 X 4 X
Funct 10 X 4 X
Funct 11 X 4, 6 X
Funct 12 X 4, 6
Funct 13 X X 4, 6
Funct 14 X X X X X X X 4
Usab 1 X 1 X
Usab 2 X 1 X
Usab 3 X 1
Usab 4 X X 1
Usab 5 X 1
Usab 6 X 1, 6
Usab 7 X X X X X X X 1
Org 1 X 2
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Req. [un] [eq] [fr] [se] [di] [tr] New Eval. Var.
Org 2 X 2 X
Org 3 X 2 X
Org 4 X 2 X
Org 5 X 2 6 X
Org 6 X 2
Org 7 X 2, 6
Org 8 X X 2
Org 9 X 2
Org 10 X X X X X X 2
Org 11 X 2
Assur 1 X 4 6
Assur 2 X 3
Assur 3 X 3 X
Assur 4 X X X 4
Assur 5 X 3 X
Assur 6 X 3 6
Assur 7 X X 3
Assur 8 X 3 6
Assur 9 X 2 X
Assur 10 X X X X X X 2 X
Assur 11 X X X X X X 2 X
Assur 12 X X X X X X 2
Audit 1 X 4
Audit 2 X 4, 6
Audit 3 X 4
Audit 4 X 4
Audit 5 X 4
Audit 6 X 4
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Req. [un] [eq] [fr] [se] [di] [tr] New Eval. Var.
Audit 7 X 4, 6
Audit 8 X 4
VVAT 1 X X X 2
VVAT 2 X X X 2
VVAT 3 X X X 2
VVAT 4 X X X 2 X
VVAT 5 X X X 2
VVAT 6 X X X 2
VVAT 7 X X X 2
VVAT 8 X X X X X X X 2 X
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